# Hormuz Crisis Tracker — 2026-05-31 · Cycle 2 (Desktop Substrate) **War Day**: 93 | **Ceasefire Day**: 55 | **Cycle**: C116 (C2 of 2026-05-31; C1 authored earlier today + desktop addendum) **Grok bridge**: NO — Apple Notes timed out; latest HORMUZ X-PULSE confirmed stale per C1. Reduced web sweep (delta-only vs C1; ~5 hours elapsed). **Baseline**: C115 / 2026-05-31 C1 (5-hour gap — incremental signal capture) > **PROVENANCE NOTE (desktop C2, 2026-05-31 ~22:xx UTC):** C1 was authored earlier today and re-verified by an additional desktop sweep with Section 13 Addendum. This C2 is a focused delta-only cycle capturing signals that emerged after the C1 sweep closed — primarily Trump's "no hurry" walkback, Iran's formal rejection of the blockade-end claim, the new IRGC blanket vetting order, IAEA's record HEU report, and clarifications on VLCC rates and UAE strike scope. C1 body remains authoritative for structural state; this file tracks what moved in the last several hours. --- ## ⚡ CRITICAL FLAGS THIS CYCLE - 🔴 **TRUMP WALKED BACK URGENCY — "NO HURRY" (CNBC/PBS/CBS, May 30–31)**: Trump told Lara Trump in a Fox interview taped Thursday (broadcast Saturday) he is "in no hurry to make a deal." Saturday May 31: still no signature. **Trump requested edits to the proposed MOU around handling of Iran's nuclear material and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz** (Axios). Quote: *"if you're going to be in a hurry, you're not going to make a good deal… if we don't get what we want, we're going to end it a different way."* **Material walkback of C1's "language points pending" framing — Trump publicly cooled on the timeline.** - 🔴 **IRAN FORMALLY REJECTED BLOCKADE-END CLAIM (May 30–31)**: Iran formally rejected Trump's May 29 assertion that the US naval blockade had been lifted — both Tehran's foreign ministry and state media disputed the framing. Combined with continued US enforcement (ship disabled May 30) this confirms the **announcement-vs-physical-state gap** flagged in C1 as the dominant tension. - 🔴 **IRAN'S BLANKET VETTING ORDER (May 30, post-mine)**: Within hours of Oman's mine alert, Iran's **Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters ordered all commercial vessels to travel "designated routes" and obtain advance IRGC Navy authorization** before transiting the strait. The China/India bilateral exceptions framework is now overlaid by a universal IRGC vetting requirement — Iran is consolidating, not relaxing, transit control. - 🔴 **IAEA: IRAN AMASSED RECORD MILITARY-GRADE HEU STOCKPILE (May 31)**: IAEA reported on May 31 that Iran has accumulated a record amount of military-grade enriched uranium. **Nuclear Lock 6 TIGHTENING materially** — and announced into the same window in which the MOU defers HEU disposal/enrichment to the 60-day talks track. The reporting cuts directly against the deal's no-weapon pledge premise. - 🟡 **UAE STRIKE SCOPE EXPANDED (WSJ, May 29–30)**: WSJ reported the UAE was **secretly involved in strikes against Iran from the first days of the war**, not only the late-cycle Lavan/Sirri operations flagged in C1. Reported targets include **Qeshm and Abu Musa islands (Strait of Hormuz), Bandar Abbas, Lavan refinery, and the Asaluyeh petrochemical complex**. **Saudi Arabia privately warned Washington in early April** that UAE operations could provoke wider Iranian retaliation against regional energy infrastructure. Cumulative Iranian retaliation on UAE/Kuwait: **13 killed (2 mil, 1 civ contractor, 10 civ), 224 injured.** This is a broader and longer-running covert belligerency than C1 captured. - 🟢 **HORMUZ STRAIT STILL EFFECTIVELY CLOSED (May 31 trackers)**: straits.live and Hormuz Strait Monitor show ~4 transits May 31 vs ~95/day pre-war normal; Hormuz Index Crisis Pressure composite **94 (extreme)** — markets/analysts not pricing imminent resolution despite price decline. Physical state holds; the price move is sentiment-driven. --- ## 1. Conflict Status — Delta vs C1 **War Day 93 / Ceasefire Day 55** (unchanged). **Key new developments since C1**: - May 30 (late): Iran formally rejected Trump's blockade-end claim; foreign ministry + state media disputed framing. - May 30: Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central HQ issued blanket vetting order — all commercial vessels must travel designated routes + obtain advance IRGC Navy authorization. - May 30 (evening): Critical Threats Project special report confirms $12B precondition is Iran's "main" condition per negotiator close to Speaker Ghalibaf. - May 31: IAEA reports record military-grade HEU stockpile — the IAEA report drops mid-negotiation, complicating the no-weapon pledge premise. - May 31: Trump's "no hurry" interview airs (taped Thursday); Saturday Situation Room readout = still no deal; Trump requested MOU edits on nuclear material handling + Hormuz reopening. - WSJ revealed UAE covert strike campaign began in the first days of the war (not just the late-cycle Lavan/Sirri operations) — Saudi Arabia warned US in early April. **Ceasefire likelihood assessment vs C1**: **DOWNGRADED**. C1 read the tentative MOU as "elevated probability, pending signature." C2 evidence — Trump's public "no hurry," Iran's formal rejection of the blockade-end claim, the IRGC blanket vetting order, the IAEA HEU report, and Iran's $12B precondition restated — collectively imply both sides are publicly hardening their positions over the weekend. The framework still exists, but the signature path narrowed. Watch Monday's market open. --- ## 2. Strait of Hormuz — Operational Delta vs C1 | Parameter | Status C2 | Δ vs C1 | |-----------|-----------|---------| | Transits/day (May 31 trackers) | ~4 transits (straits.live) vs ~95/day pre-war normal | CONFIRMED (still near floor) | | Strait status (live tracker) | **CLOSED** (straits.live); Hormuz Index 94 (extreme) | CONFIRMED | | US blockade — political | Ended May 29 (Trump) | CONFIRMED | | US blockade — physical | Continued enforcement; ship disabled May 30 | CONFIRMED | | Iran's stance on blockade-end | **Formally rejected** (foreign ministry + state media) | **NEW** | | **IRGC universal vetting** | **Blanket order May 30 — all vessels need IRGC Navy pre-auth + designated routes** | **NEW — TIGHTENING** | | Mine threat | CRITICAL — May 30 Oman alert (suspected mine); US has not confirmed mines | CONFIRMED | | China/India exceptions | Still operational under bilateral mechanisms | CONFIRMED | | Pentagon posture | Asserts safe passage despite mine presence | CONFIRMED | | P&I re-entry | No re-entry — Day 55 | CONFIRMED | **Key narrative**: C1's central observation — that the blockade-end announcement runs ahead of physical normalization — was reinforced over the next 5 hours by Iran's formal rejection, the IRGC blanket vetting order, and the May 30 mine alert. Iran is consolidating transit control, not relaxing it. Physical transit count unchanged (~4/day). --- ## 3. Tanker Attack Log — Delta vs C1 **Running total unchanged at ~83+ commercial incidents, 41+ UKMTO reports since Feb 28.** | Date | Vessel/Target | Flag/Operator | Location | Type | Damage | Δ | |------|--------------|---------------|----------|------|--------|---| | Early April–late May | **Multiple Iranian sites** (Qeshm, Abu Musa, Bandar Abbas, Lavan, Asaluyeh) | Iran (infra/territory) | Gulf / Strait islands | **UAE covert strikes (dozens, since first days of war per WSJ)** | Refinery / petrochem / island infrastructure damage | **NEW SCOPE — broader than C1** | | Cumulative (UAE/Kuwait, since war start) | Iranian retaliation strikes on UAE + Kuwait | Iran (mil) | UAE / Kuwait territory | Missile/drone | **13 killed (2 mil, 1 civ contractor, 10 civ), 224 injured** | **NEW DATA** | | May 30 | [unnamed commercial] | — | Approaching Iran | US blockade disablement (continued enforcement) | Disabled | CONFIRMED in C1 | | May 30–31 | No new UKMTO incidents reported | — | — | — | — | **STABLE this window** | The major C2 correction is **scope** of UAE belligerency: not late-cycle only, but a campaign running from the first days of the war (per WSJ). Append-only log; prior entries preserved in C1 and earlier reports. --- ## 4. Oil Prices — Delta vs C1 Markets closed Friday May 29 at the levels C1 captured (Brent ~$91.2, WTI ~$87.7–93.9). Saturday/Sunday have no major futures session. | Benchmark | Friday May 29 Close | C2 Note | Δ vs C1 | |-----------|---------------------|---------|---------| | Brent | $91.12 | Pre-Monday: weekend headlines lean hawkish (Trump "no hurry"; IAEA HEU report; Iran rejection) — Monday gap-up risk | CONFIRMED | | WTI | ~$87.7–93.9 | Same Monday gap-up risk | CONFIRMED | | Monthly move (May) | −17% to −19% (biggest since 2020) | Captured | CONFIRMED | | Hormuz Index Crisis Pressure | **94 (extreme)** — markets not pricing imminent resolution | **NEW DATA POINT** | **NEW** | **C2 price note**: With weekend signal flow uniformly hawkish vs C1's read (Trump cooling, Iran rejecting, IAEA HEU stockpile record, IRGC blanket vetting), **Monday Asia/Europe opens carry asymmetric upside risk for Brent**. The $90–100 analyst band in C1 may be tested on the upside if the deal slips into a multi-week impasse. The Hormuz Index at 94 (extreme) confirms structural pricing has not moved despite the headline rally — the spot-vs-structure decoupling C1 flagged remains the defining tension. --- ## 5. Strategic Petroleum Reserves — Delta vs C1 No new IEA/national SPR announcements in the C2 window. State unchanged from C1: - IEA 400M bbl committed; ~280M+ consumed; through ~July 2026. - US 172M bbl SPR draw = 1.4 mb/d (~15% lost supply). - Japan 80M bbl; ~150 days DOS; ¥300B/month emergency cost. - China not releasing; ~108 days; discounted Iranian/Russian crude. - India 21.4M bbl ISPRL; ~30 days; OMC losses ₹1,000 cr/day. **SPR runway**: unchanged at ~47 days nominal coverage; long exhausted on paper (Day 93). If Trump's "no hurry" stretches the impasse, the announcement-vs-physical-delivery gap reopens. **STALE; no C2 movement.** --- ## 6. Bypass Infrastructure — Delta vs C1 | Route | Capacity | Utilization | C2 Note | Δ | |-------|---------|-------------|---------|---| | Saudi E-W Petroline | 7 mb/d (3–4 Yanbu cap) | AT CAPACITY | unchanged | CONFIRMED | | UAE ADCOP | 1.5 mb/d (1.8 surge) | ~71% | unchanged | CONFIRMED | | Iraq south (Basra) | ~3 mb/d pre-war | **April production 1,494 BBL/D/1K vs 1,906 March** (Trading Economics) | Confirms recovery to ~1.5 mb/d not yet sustained | **NEW DATA** | | Iraq Kirkuk–Ceyhan | 0.25 mb/d | Maintenance final phase; up to 600 kbpd potential | Restart timing unspecified | CONFIRMED | | Proposed Basra–Haditha pipeline | **2.5 mb/d** (revised up from 2.25) | Construction started | Years to deliver | **UPGRADED capacity number** | | **Total bypass effective** | **~5–6 mb/d** | unchanged | | CONFIRMED | **GAP: ~14–15 mb/d UNBRIDGEABLE** — unchanged. Iraq's April production at 1,494 BBL/D/1K (down from 1,906 March) confirms recovery is fragile, not consolidated. --- ## 7. Maritime Insurance & Shipping — Delta vs C1 | Parameter | C2 Status | Δ vs C1 | |-----------|-----------|---------| | P&I coverage | **Still ALL WITHDRAWN — Day 55** | CONFIRMED — no re-entry | | War risk premium | 1–5% hull (US/UK/IL higher); ~$2–3M/VLCC voyage; up to $10–14M w/ US nexus | CONFIRMED | | **VLCC benchmark rate** | **~$100K/day (Lloyd's List, May 2026)** — down from $423K March peak as volumes collapsed | **NEW DATA — clarification** | | Iran's "Hormuz Safe" insurance scheme | Iran-state-backed alternative offering coverage for strait transits | **NEW (Al Jazeera, May 18 — surfaced this cycle)** | | DFC backstop | $40B revolving (Chubb lead) | CONFIRMED | | Lloyd's | "Stands ready" — conditions absent | CONFIRMED | **Key C2 correction**: VLCC rates are not at the $423K peak as C1 carried; they fell to ~$100K/day as Hormuz **volumes collapsed 36%** (Lloyd's List). The rate decline reflects volume destruction, not de-escalation — voyages are longer, ton-miles are altered, and the absence of P&I coverage continues to bottleneck commercial commitment. **Iran's "Hormuz Safe" scheme** (surfaced more clearly this cycle) is the strongest signal yet that the insurance vacuum is being filled by state-backed alternatives — likely with limited acceptance by Western owners but operational for China/India bilateral exceptions and shadow-fleet flows. **P&I re-entry remains ABSENT — Day 55.** Structural de-escalation indicator still has not fired. --- ## 8. Shadow Fleet & Sanctions — Delta vs C1 - No new US seizures in the C2 window (SKYWAVE May 19 remains the last confirmed; CENTCOM cumulative: 84 redirected, 4 disabled, 3 seized). - Iran's "Hormuz Safe" insurance scheme adds insurance optionality for shadow-fleet flows. - $12B Qatar-held frozen asset precondition restated by Iranian negotiator close to Speaker Ghalibaf (May 30 evening) — confirmed across multiple outlets (Iran International, Jerusalem Post, TASS, Middle East Monitor). - Trump publicly requested MOU edits on Hormuz reopening — sanctions-relief mechanism may shift in subsequent drafts. --- ## 9. Country Response Matrix — Delta vs C1 | Country | Posture C2 | Key Δ vs C1 | |---------|-----------|-------------| | **USA** | Trump publicly "no hurry"; requested MOU edits on nuclear material + Hormuz reopening | **DOWNGRADED (toward delay)** | | **Iran** | Formally rejected blockade-end claim; IRGC blanket vetting order; $12B precondition restated; IAEA flagged record HEU | **DOWNGRADED (consolidating control)** | | **UAE** | WSJ: covert strike campaign began in first days of war (not just late-cycle); Saudi warned US early April | **SCOPE EXPANDED** | | **Saudi Arabia** | Revealed: warned US in early April that UAE ops could provoke wider Iranian retaliation against regional energy infrastructure | **NEW** | | **Qatar** | Ras Laffan: North site (41 mtpa) restartable within month of restart; South site by end of summer; 17% capacity lost for years | **REFINED TIMELINE** | | **Iraq** | April production 1,494 vs 1,906 March (Trading Economics); Kirkuk-Ceyhan inspection final phase | **CONFIRMED — fragile recovery** | | **Oman** | Issued mine alert May 30; Iran imposed blanket vetting in response | **CONFIRMED** | | **China / India** | Operating under bilateral mechanisms; now overlaid by IRGC blanket vetting | **AMBIGUOUS** | | **Philippines** | National emergency unchanged; June 30 deadline ~30 days out | STALE | --- ## 10. Policy & Regulatory — Delta vs C1 | Date | Actor | Action | Δ | |------|-------|--------|---| | May 31 | IAEA | Reported Iran amassed record military-grade HEU stockpile | **NEW — HIGH** | | May 31 | Trump (CBS/CNBC/PBS) | "No hurry to make a deal"; requested MOU edits on nuclear material + Hormuz | **NEW — HIGH (walkback signal)** | | May 30 | Iran (foreign ministry + state media) | Formally rejected Trump's blockade-end claim | **NEW** | | May 30 | Iran (Khatam al-Anbiya Central HQ) | Ordered all commercial vessels to use designated routes + obtain IRGC Navy pre-authorization | **NEW — TIGHTENING** | | May 30 | Oman Maritime Security Centre | Issued mine alert in territorial waters at the strait | CONFIRMED in C1 Addendum | | May 30 | Iran (Ghalibaf-aligned negotiator) | Restated $12B Qatar-held frozen asset precondition as "main" condition | CONFIRMED | | Early April | Saudi Arabia (revealed late May) | Privately warned Washington UAE ops could trigger Iranian energy-infra retaliation | **NEW** | --- ## 11. Key Metrics Dashboard — Delta vs C1 | Metric | Value | Trend | Cycle Δ vs C1 | |--------|-------|-------|--------------| | Conflict day | 93 | → | unchanged | | Ceasefire day | 55 | → | unchanged | | Iran civ dead (cum) | 1,701+ of 3,636+ | → | STALE | | Iran displaced | >1M–3.2M | → | STALE | | US KIA/wounded | 13 / 381+ | → | CONFIRMED | | **UAE+Kuwait Iranian retaliation casualties** | **13 killed (2 mil, 1 civ-contractor, 10 civ), 224 injured** | → | **NEW** | | Strait transits/day (May 31) | ~4 | → | CONFIRMED | | **Hormuz Index Crisis Pressure** | **94 (extreme)** | → | **NEW** | | Brent crude (May 29 close) | $91.12 | ↑ risk Monday open | CONFIRMED | | WTI crude (May 29 close) | ~$87.7–93.9 | ↑ risk Monday open | CONFIRMED | | **VLCC day rates** | **~$100K/day (vol-collapse driven)** | ↓ from $423K peak | **CORRECTED vs C1 STALE** | | Hormuz VLCC volumes | −36% (Lloyd's List) | → | NEW DATA | | War risk premium | 1–5% hull | → | CONFIRMED | | **Iran's "Hormuz Safe" insurance** | Operational as state-backed alternative | → | **NEW** | | Vessels attacked (cum) | ~83+ | → | unchanged | | IEA / US / Japan SPR | 400M / 172M / 80M | → | STALE | | Iraq oil production (April avg) | 1,494 BBL/D/1K | ↓ vs March 1,906 | NEW DATA | | US blockade — political | Ended May 29 | → | CONFIRMED | | US blockade — physical | Continued enforcement May 30 | → | CONFIRMED | | **Iran rejection of blockade-end** | **Formal** | → | **NEW** | | **IRGC blanket vetting order** | **In force May 30** | ↑ | **NEW** | | **IAEA HEU stockpile** | **RECORD military-grade level (May 31 report)** | ↑↑ | **NEW** | | **Iran $12B precondition** | Restated as "main" condition | → | CONFIRMED | | Total bypass capacity | ~5–6 mb/d | → | unchanged | | **Supply GAP** | **~14–15 mb/d** | → | UNBRIDGEABLE | | India reserve days | ~30 | ↓ | DOWNGRADED | | Mine threat | CRITICAL | → | confirmed by May 30 alert | | IRGC posture | Asserts vetting authority + designated routes | ↑ | **TIGHTENING** | | P&I insurance | **ABSENT — Day 55** | → | CONFIRMED — no re-entry | | **Trump posture** | **"No hurry"; MOU edits requested** | ↓ urgency | **NEW — walkback** | | **Ceasefire formalization probability** | **DOWNGRADED vs C1** | ↓ | **NEW** | | Qatar Ras Laffan | North site restartable in month of restart; South by end-summer; 17% capacity lost for years | → | REFINED | | Dual chokepoint | ACTIVE | → | CONFIRMED | | Kharg slick | STALE | → | unchanged | | UAE covert strike scope | Dozens of strikes since first days of war (WSJ) | ↑ | **SCOPE EXPANDED** | | Saudi warning to US (revealed) | Early April | → | **NEW** | | SE Asia crisis | Philippines emergency; June 30 deadline ~30 days | → | STALE | --- ## 12. Convergence Assessment ### (a) What Changed This Cycle (C2 vs C1) 1. **Trump publicly cooled — "no hurry"** [NEW — HIGH]. Friday Situation Room ended without decision; Saturday Fox interview airs with explicit "no hurry"; Saturday Trump requests MOU edits on nuclear material handling and Hormuz reopening. C1's "language points pending" reframed as a multi-week impasse risk. 2. **Iran formally rejected blockade-end claim** [NEW]. Foreign ministry + state media both pushed back on Trump's May 29 framing. The political/physical gap C1 flagged is now also a narrative gap. 3. **IRGC blanket vetting order (May 30)** [NEW — TIGHTENING]. Khatam al-Anbiya Central HQ requires all commercial vessels to use designated routes + obtain IRGC Navy pre-authorization. Iran consolidating transit control on the same weekend the deal was supposed to formalize. 4. **IAEA: record military-grade HEU stockpile (May 31)** [NEW — HIGH]. IAEA report drops mid-negotiation, directly complicating the MOU's no-weapon pledge premise. Nuclear Lock 6 TIGHTENING; HEU disposal pushed into the 60-day talks track per C1 framework, now under harder light. 5. **UAE strike scope expanded — campaign since first days of war (WSJ)** [NEW SCOPE]. Not just late-cycle Lavan/Sirri; targets include Qeshm, Abu Musa, Bandar Abbas, Lavan, Asaluyeh petrochemical. **Saudi Arabia warned US in early April** that UAE ops could trigger Iranian energy-infra retaliation. Iranian retaliation cumulative on UAE/Kuwait: 13 killed, 224 injured. 6. **VLCC rate clarification — ~$100K/day, not $423K** [CORRECTION]. C1 carried the C88 $423K peak as STALE. Lloyd's List (May 2026) shows rates fell to ~$100K as Hormuz volumes collapsed 36%. The rate decline is volume-driven, not de-escalation-driven. 7. **Iran's "Hormuz Safe" state-backed insurance scheme surfaced more clearly** [NEW]. Tehran filling the insurance vacuum left by P&I withdrawal — likely operational for China/India bilateral + shadow-fleet flows. 8. **Iraq April production 1,494 vs 1,906 March** [NEW DATA]. Confirms recovery is fragile, not consolidated; bypass envelope holds at ~5–6 mb/d. ### (b) Structural Locks Status — Delta vs C1 **Lock 1 — Price** [LOOSENING but with C2 reversal risk]. Brent $91.12 May 29 close holds; Monday open faces asymmetric upside risk on weekend hawkish signal flow. The May −17% to −19% gain may give back materially. **Lock 2 — Supply** [HOLDING — was loosening in C1]. Iran's formal rejection of blockade-end + IRGC blanket vetting order means C1's "legal loosening" framing weakened. Transits still ~4/day; Iran *consolidating* control. **Lock 3 — Insurance** [HOLDING]. P&I absent Day 55. No C2 movement. Iran's Hormuz Safe scheme is a workaround, not Western re-entry. **Lock 4 — Labor** [HOLDING]. Unchanged — ~22,500 trapped. **Lock 5 — Duration** [DOWNGRADED — was loosening in C1]. Trump's "no hurry" + Iran's $12B precondition restated + MOU edits requested = signature window slipped. C1's "single highest-leverage event" (Trump signature) now indefinite. **Lock 6 — Nuclear** [TIGHTENING — was holding-by-deferral]. IAEA's record HEU report directly contradicts the MOU's no-weapon pledge premise; HEU disposal still deferred but under harder light. **Lock 7 — Geographic** [TIGHTENING vs C1's "mixed"]. UAE covert campaign confirmed as longer-running than C1 captured; Saudi early-April warning reveals more belligerency than visible; Iranian retaliation on UAE/Kuwait has produced 13 killed cumulatively. **Lock 8 — Capability** [HOLDING]. No US minesweepers; mine-clearance 6 months; new May 30 mine alert + IRGC vetting; Project Freedom paused. **Lock 9 — Dual Chokepoint** [HOLDING]. Suez ~60% below normal; Houthi rerouting through 2027 baseline. **Lock 10 — Leadership** [HOLDING — was loosening slowly]. Iranian factional contradiction widening (negotiators vs. state media + IRGC + Speaker Ghalibaf camp); blanket vetting + $12B precondition + formal blockade-end rejection mean the consolidation-side is winning the weekend. **Lock 11 — Energy Infra** [TIGHTENING vs C1's "holding-worsened"]. WSJ confirms much broader UAE campaign on Iranian energy/petrochem infrastructure (Asaluyeh added). Ras Laffan timeline refined — North site near-term restart possible; South site end-summer; 17% capacity lost for years. **Tally C2: 1 loosening (Price, with reversal risk), 6 holding, 4 tightening (Supply, Duration, Nuclear, Geographic-Locks-7, Energy Infra). Net direction REVERSED vs C1: C1 was 4 loosening / 5 holding / 2 mixed-worsened; C2 is decisively toward tightening over the weekend.** ### (c) Critical Watch (Next Cycle) - **Monday Asia/Europe oil open** — does Brent gap up >$3–5 on weekend hawkish flow? Confirms C2 price-reversal thesis. - **Trump weekend/early-week posture** — does "no hurry" harden into formal walk, or is it negotiating posture before signature? - **Iranian response to IAEA HEU report** — confirm or deny stockpile; nuclear talks framing reset. - **Iranian retaliation for May 25–26 US strikes** — still pending; weekend signal flow makes restraint less likely. - **Saudi public position** — does the revealed April warning shift Saudi posture from bypass-provider to active diplomatic player? - **P&I re-entry watch** — Lock 3 confirmation signal, still absent. - **Strait transit count** — any move above the ~4/day floor would be the first physical de-escalation signal in weeks. - **Iran's "Hormuz Safe" insurance scheme uptake** — measures how much of the China/India bilateral + shadow-fleet flow can route around Western insurance vacuum. ### (d) Net Assessment C1 captured the apex of the diplomatic track: a tentative MOU, ended naval blockade, and the largest single-month oil-price decline since 2020. C2 captures the apex turning. Over a five-hour window the structural signals reversed direction across the locks that drive the system. Trump publicly cooled — "no hurry, I'd like to say I'm in a hurry, because gasoline prices are going to come tumbling down, but if you're going to be in a hurry, you're not going to make a good deal… if we don't get what we want, we're going to end it a different way" — and requested edits to the MOU on nuclear material handling and Hormuz reopening. Iran formally rejected the blockade-end framing through the foreign ministry and state media. The IRGC issued a blanket vetting order requiring all commercial vessels to use designated routes and obtain Navy pre-authorization — consolidating, not relaxing, transit control. The IAEA reported a record military-grade enriched uranium stockpile on the same day, dropping a hard fact into the MOU's no-weapon pledge premise. And the WSJ revealed the UAE covert strike campaign began in the first days of the war, with Saudi Arabia having privately warned Washington in early April that the operations risked exactly the kind of regional energy-infra retaliation that materialized. The market does not yet know any of this is a reversal. Friday closed Brent at $91.12 on the C1 narrative; Monday opens on the C2 narrative. The asymmetry favors gap-up — but the **structural** picture (transits at ~4/day, P&I absent Day 55, GAP ~14–15 mb/d, Iran's Hormuz Safe scheme operational, VLCC volumes down 36%) was never priced into the May 17% decline. The price has room to retrace toward the structural reality without anything physical changing. The off-ramp from C1 is still on the table — a written MOU exists, the framework is documented, and the ceasefire (however violated) has held 55 days. But the locks moved the wrong way this weekend. **C1's "deal probability elevated, pending signature" reads as C2's "deal in indefinite limbo, four locks tightening, one reversing." The hard call: if Monday's open does not snap the price premium back at least partway, the market is mispricing the weekend.** Watch the open; watch P&I; watch the IRGC vetting order's first enforcement action; watch whether Iran acknowledges or rejects the IAEA HEU finding. The next 72 hours are the test of whether the C1 framework holds or the locks resume their pre-deal pattern. --- ## 13. Sources CBS News live updates (Trump "no hurry"; ceasefire); CNBC (May 31 "still no deal"; Hormuz oil-price); PBS NewsHour (Trump "no hurry"); Axios (Trump requested MOU edits); CNN (May 25–26 strikes; May 29 blockade end); NBC News (Iran ceasefire-violation; strike trade); NPR (negotiations); Wikipedia (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis; 2026 Iran war; UAE 2026 Iran war); Al Jazeera (Iran's Hormuz Safe insurance; live updates); WSJ (UAE covert strike campaign; ~90M barrels offshore — via national-security press cycle); Lloyd's List (VLCC ~$100K rate; volumes −36%); National Security Journal (UAE Lavan/Asaluyeh); WANA (Lavan retaliation); Iran International / Jerusalem Post / TASS / Middle East Monitor (Iran $12B Qatar precondition); Critical Threats Project (May 30 evening special report); House of Saud / Al Arabiya English / ABC News (Oman mine alert; IRGC vetting order); Newsx (May 31 strait status); Hormuz Strait Monitor / straits.live (~4 transits, Crisis Pressure 94); Trading Economics / Iraqi News / Al Arabiya / The National (Iraq production + Basra-Haditha pipeline 2.5 mb/d); The National / NaturalGasIntel / Oil & Gas Middle East / The Business Standard (Ras Laffan timeline); IAEA Board of Governors materials; ISIS Online (HEU analysis); Foreign Policy (Grossi on Isfahan HEU). --- *Scout — C116 / C2 of 2026-05-31. Desktop substrate delta-only sweep. Grok bridge: NO. C1 body remains authoritative for structural state; this file tracks the 5-hour weekend signal reversal.*