Hormuz Crisis Tracker — 2026-05-14 · Morning Cycle

SIGNIFICANT: TRUMP-XI SUMMIT DAY 1 — OUTCOMES EMERGING; NO IRAN BREAKTHROUGH

Trump-Xi bilateral meetings ran Thursday morning Beijing time (May 14). Key signals:

• Xi's "Thucydides Trap" framing. Xi asked Trump whether the US and China can avoid the historical pattern where rising and ruling powers go to war. This is diplomatic signaling — Xi positioning the relationship as existential, not transactional. It raises the bar for what can be traded (Iran pressure) in exchange for what (Taiwan restraint, tariff rollback).
• Taiwan red line explicit. Xi told Trump Taiwan is "the most important issue" and mishandling it could lead to "clashes and even conflicts." This constrains what Trump can extract on Iran — asking Xi to pressure Tehran while Xi needs something on Taiwan.
• Iran discussed but no specifics. Chinese media confirmed discussions covered "the Middle East situation." Trump expected to ask Xi to push Tehran on Hormuz reopening. Araghchi's recent Beijing visit suggests China already positioning as having weighed in with Iran.
• Delegation composition. US side includes Rubio, Musk, Cook, Jensen Huang. Business delegation signals trade-deal architecture (Board of Trade + Board of Investment), not security-first summit.
• Board of Trade expected. Boeing purchases, agriculture deals, energy imports anticipated as concrete deliverables. Rare earth leverage looms: China controls minerals needed for US missile interceptor rebuild.
• Day 2 (May 15) is the pivot. Press conference and potential communiqué. Iran-specific language — if any — comes tomorrow.

SIGNIFICANT: BRENT EASES TO ~$105.87 — SUMMIT OPTIMISM CREATING MILD DOWNWARD PRESSURE

Brent crude eased to ~$105.87/bbl on May 14 (up 0.22% intraday but down ~$1.18 from C78's $107.05). WTI steady ~$102. IEA warning: market could remain "severely undersupplied until October." The dip reflects mild summit optimism on trade deals, not fundamentals change. EIA floor ($106/b May-June) is being tested. Aramco CEO's "normalization next year" language still the structural anchor.

SIGNIFICANT: PGSA TOLLS UP TO $2M PER TRANSIT — SETTLED IN YUAN

Lloyd's List reports vessels paying up to $2 million for PGSA transit approval, with tolls settled in Chinese yuan. Iran warned countries complying with US sanctions face difficulties; US/Israel-linked ships denied passage entirely. This is the most detailed pricing signal from the PGSA regime to date. The yuan settlement detail has geopolitical implications — it routes Hormuz toll revenue through the Chinese financial system, creating a bilateral dependency that reinforces the Xi-Khamenei axis and complicates US secondary sanctions enforcement.

SIGNIFICANT: DFC REINSURANCE — $40B REVOLVING FACILITY (UPGRADE FROM C78's $20B)

The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced it will partner with leading US insurers to establish a reinsurance facility providing up to $40 billion in coverage on a revolving basis. C78 tracked $20B; this is now confirmed at $40B. This is the US attempting to break the insurance lock by substituting government-backed reinsurance for the absent P&I market. Whether it actually induces vessels to transit remains to be seen — the war risk premium (3-8% hull value, $3-8M per large tanker) and crew refusal problem persist regardless of reinsurance availability.

SIGNIFICANT: LEBANON ROUND 3 — MILITARY REPS JOIN FOR FIRST TIME; HEZBOLLAH DISARMAMENT ON TABLE

Lebanon Round 3 opened May 14 in Washington. For the first time, military representatives from each side join diplomats. Concrete measures to disarm Hezbollah on the agenda. C78's Dermer correction stands — sources still conflict on whether Dermer leads. Wikipedia says Dermer leads; other sources say BG Levin military head with Leiter + Resnik. The introduction of military representatives and Hezbollah disarmament discussion represent a substantive upgrade from the procedural first two rounds. Three-week ceasefire extension from Round 2 holds.

CONFIRMED: HEU STOCKPILE GEOGRAPHY — MOST AT ISFAHAN TUNNELS; 450KG = 11 BOMBS

Axios and TWZ reporting confirms: most of Iran's 450kg of 60%-enriched uranium sits in the underground tunnels at Isfahan, with the rest split between Fordow and Natanz. At 90% purity, this is enough material for 11 nuclear bombs. This confirms the Isfahan site from C78 is not just an enrichment node but the primary HEU storage location — making the Israeli special forces HEU mission option (C78) directly targeted at Isfahan's tunnel complex. The decision window (May 15-16) coincides with Trump's Beijing return.

Top-line movers (C78→C79 delta — 8 items)

1. TRUMP-XI SUMMIT DAY 1 OUTCOMES. Xi: "Thucydides Trap" framing + Taiwan explicit red line. Iran discussed, no specifics. Board of Trade expected. Musk/Cook/Huang in delegation. Day 2 (May 15) is the pivot. IN PROGRESS — AWAIT MAY 15 OUTCOMES.

1. BRENT EASES TO ~$105.87. Down ~$1.18 from C78. Testing EIA $106 floor. Summit optimism, not fundamentals change. IEA: undersupplied until October. PRICE DIP — FLOOR TEST.

1. PGSA TOLLS: UP TO $2M PER TRANSIT, SETTLED IN YUAN. Most granular pricing to date. Yuan settlement routes toll revenue through Chinese financial system. NEW DETAIL — GEOPOLITICAL PRICING.

1. DFC REINSURANCE: $40B REVOLVING FACILITY. Upgraded from C78's $20B figure. Government attempting to substitute for absent P&I market. UPGRADED — SCALE DOUBLED.

1. LEBANON ROUND 3: MILITARY REPS + HEZBOLLAH DISARMAMENT. First time military representatives join. Concrete measures to disarm Hezbollah on table. UPGRADED — SUBSTANTIVE AGENDA.

1. HEU GEOGRAPHY CONFIRMED. Most of 450kg at Isfahan tunnels. 11 bombs at 90%. Israeli HEU mission targets this location. CONFIRMED — GEOGRAPHIC SPECIFICITY.

1. MINE-CLEARING BEGAN APRIL 11. Trump stated US forces started "clearing" the strait. Timeline for completion unknown. STALE BUT NEWLY CONFIRMED.

1. ASEAN CEBU SUMMIT. Foreign Policy: "The Fuel Crisis Is Testing ASEAN's Limits." Regional coordination failing. CONFIRMED — INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE.

1. Conflict Status — DAY 76 / CEASEFIRE DAY 37

2. Strait Operational Status — PGSA TOLL REGIME PRICED; YUAN SETTLEMENT

3. Tanker Attacks Log — NO NEW ATTACKS THIS CYCLE

4. Oil Prices — BRENT ~$105.87; TESTING EIA $106 FLOOR

5. SPR — ~133M OF 172M UNDERWAY; SPR INVENTORY ~409M BBL

6. Bypass Infrastructure — SAUDI E-W ATTACKED IN APRIL; FUJAIRAH STRUCK MULTIPLE TIMES

7. Maritime Insurance — P&I DAY 78+; DFC $40B FACILITY

8. Shadow Fleet & Sanctions

9. Country Response Matrix — C79 UPDATE

10. Policy Log (C79 additions — May 14)

• May 14 — Trump-Xi summit Day 1, Beijing. "Thucydides Trap" framing from Xi. Taiwan: "most important issue." Iran discussed under "Middle East situation." Delegation: Rubio, Musk, Cook, Jensen Huang. Board of Trade + Board of Investment expected. Day 2 May 15 continues. (CNBC, Al Jazeera, CNN, Euronews, CBS)
• May 14 — Lebanon Round 3 opened, Washington. Military representatives join for first time. Hezbollah disarmament on table. Three-week ceasefire extension holds from Round 2. (Wikipedia, Newsmax, The National, L'Orient Today)
• May 14 — Qingdao Haiye Oil Terminal sanctioned. China-based terminal targeted for importing tens of millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Part of tightening Iran-China oil trade enforcement. (State Department)
• May 14 — PGSA tolls confirmed: up to $2M per transit, settled in Chinese yuan. US/Israel-linked ships denied passage. Countries complying with US sanctions face difficulties. (Lloyd's List, AGBI, Maritime Executive, Modern Diplomacy)
• May 14 — DFC reinsurance: $40B revolving facility. Upgraded from prior $20B reports. Government-backed attempt to break insurance lock. (WEF, Khaleej Times)
• Ongoing — US mine-clearing operation in Strait. Began April 11 per Trump statement. No timeline for completion. (Wikipedia)
• May 12 — FP: "Fuel Crisis Is Testing ASEAN's Limits." Cebu summit. Regional coordination failing. (Foreign Policy)

11. Key Metrics Dashboard — C79

12. Convergence Assessment

What Changed This Cycle (C78→C79)

1. The Trump-Xi summit Day 1 produced framing, not substance on Iran. Xi's "Thucydides Trap" opening is the most important signal — it frames US-China as a structural rivalry question, not a transactional one. This raises the cost of what Trump can extract: asking Xi to pressure Tehran on Hormuz requires offering something on Taiwan, tariffs, or rare earths that Xi values at the same structural level. The business delegation (Musk, Cook, Jensen Huang) confirms the summit is trade-architecture-first. Board of Trade + Board of Investment are the expected deliverables. Iran discussion confirmed but characterized generically as "the Middle East situation" — no indication of specific Hormuz reopening commitment or Xi leverage on Tehran. Day 2 (May 15) is the pivot: if the press conference produces only trade language and boilerplate on Middle East, the "Trump returns from Beijing with only trade deals" scenario from C78's assessment triggers, raising probability of military action in the May 15-16 decision window.

1. PGSA toll pricing in yuan is the cycle's structural geopolitical signal. Vessels paying up to $2M per transit, settled in Chinese yuan, means the Hormuz toll regime is financially integrated with the Chinese financial system. This does three things: (a) creates a revenue stream for Iran that bypasses dollar-denominated sanctions, (b) gives China a financial stake in PGSA continuation, and (c) makes OFAC secondary sanctions enforcement on PGSA compliance more complex because yuan settlements are harder to trace and interdict. The yuan settlement detail — emerging during the Trump-Xi summit — is either coincidental timing or deliberate signaling by Iran/China that the Hormuz toll regime is backed by the bilateral axis.

1. The DFC $40B reinsurance facility is the US answer to the insurance lock. Upgrading from $20B to $40B on a revolving basis represents the government substituting itself for the absent P&I market. But reinsurance does not solve the underlying problem: P&I clubs withdrew because the war risk is actuarially uninsurable, not because of liquidity. Government-backed reinsurance shifts the risk to taxpayers but does not change the physical danger to vessels, the crew refusal dynamic, or the mine threat. If a $40B-backed vessel is struck, the fiscal cost cascades. The DFC facility is politically significant (it shows the administration is trying to break the lock) but operationally insufficient without mine-clearing completion and sustained absence of attacks.

1. Lebanon Round 3 is the most substantive negotiation track of the war. Military representatives joining diplomats for the first time, with Hezbollah disarmament as an explicit agenda item, represents a qualitative shift from procedural to operational. This is the one track showing forward momentum — the three-week ceasefire extension holds, the delegation composition is deepening, and the agenda is now about concrete measures rather than frameworks. The Dermer status remains contested, but the BG Levin / Leiter / Resnik / Karam structure is credible at working level. If Round 3 produces a disarmament framework, it could create a template for the broader Iran track — though Iran has shown no willingness to link Lebanon progress to its own negotiations.

1. HEU geography confirmation changes the risk calculus of the Israeli special forces option. Isfahan's underground tunnels as the primary HEU storage site means the mission — if authorized — targets a known location with a specific objective (secure 450kg of 60% enriched uranium). This is operationally different from "strike Iranian nuclear infrastructure broadly." It is a seizure mission, not a destruction mission. The 11-bombs-at-90% calculation gives it maximum political justification. The question is whether it is physically executable: Isfahan is deep inland, the tunnels are hardened, and exfiltration with material requires sustained air superiority or ground corridor that does not currently exist. The mission remains the most escalatory option in the May 15-16 window.

1. Bypass infrastructure is more degraded than C78 tracked. The Saudi E-W pipeline was attacked in April, cutting throughput by ~700K b/d. Fujairah was struck three times in March (March 3, 14, 16). Kirkuk-Ceyhan runs at ~200K b/d (minimal). Combined realized bypass is ~6.5-7.0 mb/d, down from C78's ~7.2-7.4 mb/d. Meanwhile, Yanbu loadings have nearly tripled and Bab el-Mandeb oil shipments are up ~21% — the bypass is concentrating at the Red Sea exit, which is exactly where the Houthi threat vector operates. This is a compounding risk: the more successful the Hormuz bypass becomes, the more attractive Yanbu/Bab el-Mandeb becomes as a Houthi target. Dual chokepoint risk is not stable — it is growing proportionally with bypass utilization.

Structural Conditions — 11 Locks

Condition 1 — Price Lock — BRENT ~$105.87; TESTING EIA $106 FLOOR; IEA: UNDERSUPPLIED UNTIL OCTOBER. Summit optimism creates mild downward pressure. No oil deal expected. Lock status: SOFT TEST — FLOOR HOLDING BUT UNDER PRESSURE.

Condition 2 — Supply Lock — ~13-13.5 MB/D NET SHORTFALL; BYPASS ~6.5-7.0 MB/D (DEGRADED FROM ATTACKS). Saudi E-W -700K from April attack. Bypass concentrating at Yanbu = Houthi target growth. Lock status: CONFIRMED — BYPASS DEGRADING.

Condition 3 — Insurance Lock — P&I DAY 78+ ZERO. DFC $40B FACILITY ANNOUNCED — GOVERNMENT SUBSTITUTING FOR MARKET. Insurers demand "months of stability." Lock status: BEING CHALLENGED — DFC $40B vs. ACTUARIAL REALITY.

Condition 4 — Labor Lock — IMO: 2,000 VESSELS, 20,000 SEAFARERS STRANDED. Lock status: CONFIRMED — STRUCTURAL.

Condition 5 — Duration Lock — EIA: CLOSED THROUGH LATE MAY. IEA: UNDERSUPPLIED UNTIL OCTOBER. ARAMCO: NORMALIZATION NEXT YEAR. Three independent institutional timelines all point to months-to-years. Lock status: TIGHTEST — OCTOBER NEW FLOOR FROM IEA.

Condition 6 — Nuclear Lock — THREE-NODE ARCHITECTURE (NATANZ-FORDOW-ISFAHAN) + 450KG HEU PRIMARY AT ISFAHAN TUNNELS + IAEA BLIND + CONGRESSIONAL ENRICHMENT BAN. The geography is now confirmed. The HEU mission targets Isfahan specifically. Lock status: GEOGRAPHY CONFIRMED — TARGET SET DEFINED.

Condition 7 — Geographic Lock — BEIJING (TRUMP/XI) + WASHINGTON (LEBANON R3) + STRAIT (PGSA) + RED SEA (HOUTHIS) + ISFAHAN (HEU). FIVE THEATERS. Lock status: CONFIRMED — MAXIMUM DISPERSION + ISFAHAN ADDED.

Condition 8 — Capability Lock — MINE-CLEARING BEGAN APRIL 11 — NO COMPLETION TIMELINE. PF SUSPENDED. DECISION WINDOW MAY 15-16. Lock status: PARTIALLY ADDRESSING — MINE-CLEARING IN PROGRESS BUT DURATION UNKNOWN.

Condition 9 — Dual Chokepoint Lock — HORMUZ + RED SEA. YANBU TRAFFIC TRIPLED. BAB EL-MANDEB OIL UP 21%. BYPASS CONCENTRATION = TARGET CONCENTRATION. Lock status: COMPOUNDING — RISK GROWS WITH BYPASS UTILIZATION.

Condition 10 — Leadership Lock — TRUMP IN BEIJING (XI HOSTING). GHALIBAF: "PREPARED FOR EVERY OPTION." CONGRESS HARDENING. PGSA INSTITUTIONALIZED. YUAN SETTLEMENT = CHINA STAKE. Lock status: CONFIRMED — CHINA FINANCIAL INTEGRATION.

Condition 11 — Energy Infrastructure Lock — SOUTH PARS 12% GAS OFFLINE. RAS LAFFAN 17% + $20B ANNUAL. SAUDI E-W -700K FROM APRIL ATTACK. FUJAIRAH 3x STRUCK. 3-5YR REPAIR. Lock status: CONFIRMED — BYPASS INFRASTRUCTURE NOW ALSO DAMAGED.

Critical Watch (C80 triggers)

1. Trump-Xi Day 2 outcomes (May 15). Press conference language on Iran — boilerplate or substantive? Board of Trade signing? Rare earth agreement? Any Hormuz-specific commitment from Xi?
2. Decision window May 15-16. Trump returns from Beijing. PF Plus restart? Airstrikes 25%? HEU special forces mission authorization? This is the highest-stakes window since the war began.
3. Brent May 14-15 close. Does $106 EIA floor hold? Does Day 2 communiqué move prices?
4. Lebanon Round 3 outcomes. Does Hezbollah disarmament discussion produce a framework? Does military-to-military channel yield concrete measures?
5. PGSA enforcement escalation. Does IRGC begin boarding non-compliant vessels? Does yuan settlement expand to more transit fees?
6. DFC $40B uptake. Do any shipowners signal willingness to transit with government-backed reinsurance?
7. Houthi Yanbu threat. As bypass traffic concentrates at Red Sea exits, does Houthi interdiction materialize?
8. Mine-clearing progress. Any update on US mine-clearing operation timeline?
9. Iran response to Trump-Xi meeting. Does Tehran signal flexibility or escalation while Trump is in Beijing?
10. Congressional letter. Does Trump acknowledge or rebuff the 52+177 letter upon return?

Net Assessment

C79 is a summit-framing cycle. The Trump-Xi meeting Day 1 produced diplomatic choreography — "Thucydides Trap," "fantastic future," Taiwan red lines — but no Iran-specific outcomes. The business delegation (Musk, Cook, Jensen Huang) confirms this is a trade summit with an Iran sidebar, not an Iran summit with trade wrapping. Day 2 (May 15) determines whether Xi offered anything on Iran or whether Trump returns to Washington with only trade deals and the military decision window opens immediately.

The structural surprise of the cycle is the PGSA yuan settlement detail. Iran routing Hormuz toll revenue through the Chinese financial system during the Trump-Xi summit creates a fait accompli that is harder to unwind than any diplomatic arrangement — it gives China a direct financial stake in PGSA operations and creates a yuan-denominated revenue stream that sanctions cannot easily reach. This is the most significant geopolitical pricing signal since the PGSA was established.

The DFC $40B facility is the US attempting to break the insurance lock through fiscal substitution. It is the right tool aimed at the right lock — but the mechanism depends on shipowners believing that government reinsurance makes transit safe enough to risk crews and cargo. With P&I still at zero, mines still being cleared, and PGSA demanding $2M tolls, the DFC facility may generate political headlines without generating transit.

Lebanon Round 3 is the one track with genuine forward momentum. Military representatives joining diplomats and Hezbollah disarmament on the table represent the most substantive negotiation of the entire war — not on the Iran track, not on the ceasefire track, but on the Lebanon track. If this produces a disarmament framework, it becomes the template that C78's assessment was looking for.

Brent at ~$105.87 is testing the EIA $106 floor. This is summit-optimism-driven, not fundamentals-driven. IEA's "undersupplied until October" warning is the new institutional timeline — longer than C78's "late May reopening" EIA reference. If Day 2 produces no Iran substance, the price rebounds.

Net: summit framing without Iran substance, PGSA yuan settlement as structural geopolitical signal, DFC $40B as insurance lock challenge, Lebanon R3 as the one track with momentum, bypass degradation compounding dual chokepoint risk. May 15-16 remains the highest-stakes window since the war began.

Revised probability distribution (C79):

• Path B (full kinetic): ~33% (stable — HEU geography confirmed; decision window imminent; but summit in progress tempers immediate escalation)
• Path D+ (sustained escalation in ceasefire wrapper): ~30% (↑1 — PGSA yuan settlement institutionalizes the status quo; DFC facility signals US adapting to prolonged disruption)
• Path A' (narrow Hormuz deal + 30-day window): ~17% (↓1 — summit Day 1 produced no Iran specifics; Xi's Thucydides Trap framing raises cost of Iran pressure)
• Path E (deal signed, phased reopening): ~8% (stable)
• Path C (indefinite siege): ~7% (stable — IEA "undersupplied until October")
• Path F (deal collapses on implementation): ~5% (stable)

Risk level: EXTREME — CRITICAL — TRUMP-XI DAY 1 COMPLETED (XI "THUCYDIDES TRAP" + TAIWAN RED LINE + IRAN DISCUSSED, NO SUBSTANCE); BRENT ~$105.87 TESTING $106 FLOOR; PGSA TOLLS UP TO $2M IN YUAN (GEOPOLITICAL PRICING); DFC $40B REINSURANCE (DOUBLED); LEBANON R3 OPENED WITH MILITARY REPS + HEZBOLLAH DISARMAMENT; HEU: 450KG AT ISFAHAN TUNNELS = 11 BOMBS; IEA: UNDERSUPPLIED UNTIL OCTOBER; BYPASS DEGRADED (~6.5-7.0 MB/D, DOWN FROM ~7.2-7.4); YANBU TRAFFIC TRIPLED = HOUTHI TARGET GROWTH; MINE-CLEARING SINCE APRIL 11, NO TIMELINE; QINGDAO HAIYE SANCTIONED (CHINA-SIDE); GHALIBAF: "PREPARED FOR EVERY OPTION"; DAY 76 / CEASEFIRE DAY 37; PATH B 33% (STABLE), D+ 30% (↑1, NEW CYCLE HIGH), A' 17% (↓1); MAY 15-16 DECISION WINDOW REMAINS HIGHEST-STAKES SINCE WAR BEGAN

Sources (C79 new)

Trump-Xi Summit

• Xi asks Trump about "Thucydides Trap" — CNBC
• Trump-Xi summit live — Al Jazeera
• Live updates: Trump China visit — CNN
• Xi warns Taiwan could lead to "conflict" — Euronews
• Trump meets Xi in Beijing — CBS News
• China will have the upper hand — CFR
• Trump-Xi summit Beijing — CSIS
• Heritage Foundation: Favorable and Unfavorable Outcomes

Oil Prices

• Brent crude price data — TradingEconomics
• Oil Prices Today — OilPriceAPI
• Crude Oil Price Today May 14 — Goodreturns
• Current price of oil May 13 — Fortune

PGSA / Maritime

• How PGSA runs Hormuz toll transit — The Week India
• Iran formalises Hormuz ship approvals — AGBI
• Iran launches PGSA — Maritime Executive
• Infrastructure attribution and invoiced passage — Modern Diplomacy
• Iran imposes new Hormuz rules — CNN

Insurance / DFC

• Strait reopening won't mean cheaper shipping — Khaleej Times
• Insurance Weapon: Irregular Warfare at Hormuz — IWC
• Governments as insurers of last resort — WEF
• VLCC insurance jumps — Safety4Sea

Lebanon Round 3

• Israel-Lebanon peace talks — Wikipedia
• Third round May 14-15 — L'Orient Today
• Israel-Lebanon third round — Newsmax

Nuclear / HEU

• Iran transferred HEU to Isfahan — Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
• Special forces to seize HEU — Axios
• What a US operation to get Iran's uranium would look like — Foreign Policy
• HEU retrieval possibility rises — The War Zone

SPR / IEA

• SPR Quick Facts — DOE
• Weekly SPR stocks — EIA
• US to loan 53.3M barrels — BOE Report / Seeking Alpha

Ceasefire / Negotiations

• Iran ceasefire — Wikipedia
• Trump says ceasefire "massive life support" — CNN
• Iran's response to US proposal — Al Jazeera
• Trump weighs military action — Axios

Bypass Infrastructure

• Three pipelines bypass Hormuz — Al Jazeera
• Oil exporters scramble for routes — CNBC
• Bypass infrastructure sized for short disruption — ENR

Shadow Fleet / Sanctions

• Treasury targets shadow fleet — Treasury
• US sanctions tighten Iran-China oil trade — State Dept

SE Asia / Country Response

• Fuel crisis testing ASEAN's limits — Foreign Policy
• Asia energy crisis deepens — IndexBox
• Asian economies at risk — RSM
• Iran war fuel crisis — Wikipedia

Dual Chokepoint

• Dual chokepoint crisis — Container Mag
• Houthi entry raises twin chokepoint specter — RFE/RL

Energy Infrastructure

• South Pars strike — Wikipedia
• South Pars: energy warfare — Stimson Center
• Iran retaliatory strikes on Ras Laffan — Al Jazeera

Run completed 2026-05-14 morning (Day 76, Ceasefire Day 37). Scout automated run. Baseline C78 (hormuz-crisis-tracker_2026-05-13-c4.md) → C79 delta. Full 13-topic web sweep (Grok bridge: NO — Apple Notes MCP timed out). Key C79 deltas: (1) Trump-Xi Day 1 completed — Xi "Thucydides Trap" framing + Taiwan red line + Iran discussed under "Middle East situation," no substance; Musk/Cook/Jensen Huang in delegation; Board of Trade expected; Day 2 May 15 pivot. (2) Brent ~$105.87 — testing EIA $106 floor; IEA: undersupplied until October. (3) PGSA tolls up to $2M per transit, settled in yuan — geopolitical pricing. (4) DFC $40B revolving reinsurance facility (up from $20B). (5) Lebanon Round 3 opened — military reps join first time; Hezbollah disarmament on table. (6) HEU geography confirmed: most of 450kg at Isfahan tunnels = 11 bombs at 90%. (7) Bypass degraded to ~6.5-7.0 mb/d (Saudi E-W -700K from April attack; Fujairah 3x struck). (8) Yanbu traffic tripled; Bab el-Mandeb oil up 21% = bypass concentrating at Houthi target zone. (9) Mine-clearing began April 11, no completion timeline. (10) Qingdao Haiye Oil Terminal sanctioned (China-side enforcement). Path: B 33% (stable), D+ 30% (↑1, new cycle high — PGSA yuan + DFC signal institutional adaptation), A' 17% (↓1 — summit no Iran substance), E 8%, C 7%, F 5%. C79 frame: SUMMIT FRAMING WITHOUT IRAN SUBSTANCE; PGSA YUAN SETTLEMENT AS STRUCTURAL GEOPOLITICAL SIGNAL; DFC $40B CHALLENGES INSURANCE LOCK; LEBANON R3 ONLY TRACK WITH MOMENTUM; BYPASS DEGRADATION COMPOUNDING DUAL CHOKEPOINT; MAY 15-16 DECISION WINDOW REMAINS HIGHEST-STAKES SINCE WAR BEGAN. Risk: EXTREME — CRITICAL.

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