Hormuz Crisis Tracker — 2026-05-11 · Afternoon Cycle

⚠️ CRITICAL: BRENT BROKE $105 (+4%) — WTI BREACHED $99.95 (+5%) — MARKETS PRICING REJECTION

The C71 binary resolved decisively in the upward direction once Asian/European markets opened in full. Brent crude crossed $105/bbl (HDFC Sky), up 4%+ from C71's $104.80 close. WTI broke into the $99.95 zone, up nearly 5%. Citi maintained that "risks to oil prices remain tilted to the upside, as Iran retains significant control over the timing and terms of any potential agreement to reopen the critical Strait of Hormuz energy route."

Citi base-case framing (NEW signal): "We assume that the regime will make a deal that reopens the Strait around end-May … but we continue to see the risks skewed towards this timeline being pushed out and/or a partial reopening, which means disruptions for longer." This is the first major-bank explicit timeline assumption ("end-May") since the rejection — and Citi flags its own assumption as the optimistic case.

Sparta Commodities CEO Felipe Elink Schuurman drew the pandemic-era comparison: "Maybe you don't see $200 on crude, but you will see that on a regular basis on products, which is what people consume. You are going to end up in a scenario where poorer countries are going to have a humanitarian crisis, Europe is going to have an economic crisis and the U.S., a political one."

⚠️ CRITICAL: NETANYAHU — "THE WAR IS NOT OVER"

Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu's public statement that the conflict "is not over" surfaced as a parallel signal to Trump's "TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE" rejection. This is the first explicit Israeli rhetorical re-escalation since the Apr 8 ceasefire announcement and is read by the market as confirmation that Israel does not consider the framework constraints binding. CNBC: oil priced this as a parallel catalyst alongside Trump's rejection.

The dual signal — Trump rejection + Netanyahu re-affirmation — closes off the "soft posture" reading of C71's "diplomacy still active" framing. Both belligerents are escalating rhetorically while the backchannel persists (ToI: "closing in on framework"). The dual track has now triple-tracked: public US rejection, public Israeli re-engagement signal, and quiet backchannel narrowing.

⚠️ CRITICAL: HMS DRAGON REFRAMED "STRICTLY DEFENSIVE" — MINE CLEARANCE FOCUS

UK Defence Secretary Healey's official statement reframes the HMS Dragon mission: "strictly defensive" plan to support mine clearance and protect vessels. This is a narrower public framing than C71's "potential multinational Hormuz escort mission" and is likely calibrated to mitigate Iran's explicit threat against "extra-regional destroyers."

Healey: "I have directed HMS Dragon to the Middle East so Britain is in position to support this mission the moment it is needed." The "moment it is needed" phrasing carries a precondition — the 40-nation meeting today is consultation, not authorization. The mine clearance focus (anchored on RFA Lyme Bay MCM mothership fitting in Gibraltar) is a deliberate de-escalation of the deployment frame without reducing the actual capability build-out.

Reading: Coalition is using mine clearance as the consensus framing because it is harder for Iran to publicly oppose (clearing mines aids commercial vessels) than escort missions (which Iran can frame as armed projection).

⚠️ CRITICAL: CIA ASSESSMENT — IRAN CAN OUTLAST BLOCKADE "FOR MONTHS"

A confidential intelligence community assessment delivered to the White House finds that Iran retains a substantial missile and drone arsenal and can outlast Trump's blockade for months (WaPo, May 7). This is a material correction to the implicit US position that economic pressure forces a near-term deal. If Iran can outlast for months, the duration lock is anchored on the longer end of the IRGC's "6-month war" framing — not the shorter end.

This intelligence assessment is the strongest signal to date that the US economic-pressure model (blockade + sanctions + SPR) is calibrated against an opponent with longer endurance than baseline assumed. C71's "duration lock tightening" frame is reinforced by CIA reading.

Top-line movers (C71→C72 delta — 7 items)

1. BRENT CROSSED $105 (+4%); WTI BROKE $99.95 (+5%) — Markets fully priced Trump rejection. $105 threshold breached. $119 March peak ~88% travelled. UPGRADED FROM $104.80 TO $105+.

1. NETANYAHU: "WAR NOT OVER" — Parallel Israeli rhetorical re-escalation alongside Trump rejection. First explicit Israeli signal since Apr 8 ceasefire. NEW.

1. HMS DRAGON REFRAMED "STRICTLY DEFENSIVE" — MINE CLEARANCE — UK Defence Sec Healey official framing narrows mission to mine clearance + vessel protection. Calibrated to mitigate Iran's "extra-regional destroyers" threat. UPDATED FRAMING.

1. CITI BASE CASE: END-MAY REOPENING; RISKS TILTED TO DELAY — First major-bank explicit timeline assumption. Citi flags partial reopening = "disruptions for longer." NEW.

1. CIA: IRAN CAN OUTLAST BLOCKADE "FOR MONTHS" — Intelligence assessment delivered to White House. Duration lock anchored on longer end. NEW.

1. HEU "DILUTION + TRANSFER" — ENRICHMENT MORATORIUM "SHORTER THAN 20 YEARS" — WSJ via Al Jazeera: Iran proposed diluting HEU stockpile and transferring part to third country (not just transfer); enrichment moratorium offered "for a period shorter than 20 years" — refused dismantlement; nuclear issues to be negotiated over next 30 days. Iran demands HEU return if talks fail or US withdraws. NUANCE UPGRADED.

1. RAS LAFFAN — REPLACEMENT GAS TURBINES 2-4 YEAR LEAD TIME; $20BN/YR QATAR REVENUE LOSS — Engineering constraint formalized: replacement turbines (Trains 4 & 6) face 2-4 year lead times. Annual revenue loss $20bn. Long-term force majeure declared to China, S.Korea, Italy, Belgium. UPGRADED — REPAIR TIMELINE FORMALIZED.

1. Conflict Status — DAY 73 / CEASEFIRE DAY 34

2. Strait Operational Status — PGSA LIVE; ~40 SHIPS/WEEK; COALITION DE-ESCALATED FRAME

3. Tanker Attacks Log — RUNNING TOTAL

4. Oil Prices — BRENT CROSSED $105 (+4%); WTI $99.95 (+5%) — MARKETS PRICING REJECTION

5. SPR — STATUS UNCHANGED; CITI/JPMORGAN ANALYTICS UPDATED

6. Bypass Infrastructure — STRUCTURAL GAP HOLDS; ARAMCO Q1 +25% PROFIT (BENEFICIARY)

7. Maritime Insurance — P&I DAY 73+; $40B DFC FACILITY (7 INSURERS NAMED); $352B PRIVATE GAP

8. Shadow Fleet & Sanctions

9. Country Response Matrix — C72 UPDATE

10. Policy Log (C72 additions — May 10-11 afternoon)

• May 11 (afternoon) — Brent crossed $105 (+4%); WTI +5% to $99.95 — markets fully priced Trump rejection. (HDFC Sky / CNBC / Yahoo Finance / Trading Economics)
• May 11 (afternoon) — Netanyahu: "war is not over" — first explicit Israeli rhetorical re-escalation since Apr 8 ceasefire. (CNBC oil price coverage)
• May 11 — Healey reframes HMS Dragon mission "strictly defensive" — mine clearance + vessel protection; "moment it is needed" precondition. (CNBC / WaPo)
• May 11 — 40-nation coalition meeting today — UK-France co-chair. (UK Defence Journal / Naval News)
• May 11 — Citi: end-May reopening base case; risks skewed to delay — first major-bank explicit timeline assumption; partial reopening = "disruptions for longer." (Citi research)
• May 11 — Iran response framed "reasonable" — Iranian counter to Trump's "TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE." (CNN live updates)
• May 11 — WSJ via Al Jazeera: HEU "dilution + transfer"; enrichment moratorium "shorter than 20 years" — Iran demands HEU return if US withdraws; 30-day nuclear negotiation window. (WSJ / Al Jazeera)
• May 11 — Hardline Iranian faction sabotaging deal — even regime appeasement failing; FT/WSJ reporting. (FT)
• May 7 — CIA assessment surfaced: Iran can outlast blockade "for months" — confidential intelligence community read delivered to White House. (WaPo, surfaced this cycle)
• May 11 — Saudi Aramco Q1 profit +25% — beneficiary of Hormuz→Red Sea export shift. (Multiple)
• May 11 — UN April 7 veto background surfaced — China + Russia vetoed Bahraini-drafted UNSC Hormuz resolution; UK + US backed. (UN News, surfaced this cycle)
• May 11 — South Korea FIRST DOMESTIC FUEL PRICE CAP IN ~30 YEARS — emergency measures deepening. (Modern Diplomacy)
• May 11 — Replacement gas turbines at Ras Laffan: 2-4 year lead times — repair timeline constraint formalized. (The National)
• May 11 — The National: "One page, fourteen points, no deal: Diplomacy to end Iran war stalls" — diplomatic framing. (The National)
• May 11 — UKMTO incident running total since Feb 28: 41+ — UN News reaffirmation. (UN News)

11. Key Metrics Dashboard — C72

12. Convergence Assessment

What Changed This Cycle (C71→C72)

1. Brent crossed $105. The C71 morning binary — sub-$100 vs $105+ — resolved decisively above $105 once full markets opened. WTI broke $99.95 (+5%). The market is now priced for prolonged disruption with no near-term resolution. Citi's first explicit timeline assumption ("end-May reopening") is the optimistic case; partial reopening means "disruptions for longer." The market is no longer pricing the morning's possibility that backchannel dynamics would surface and depress the rejection signal.

1. Netanyahu re-escalated rhetorically — "war is not over." This is the first explicit Israeli re-engagement signal since the April 8 ceasefire. It transforms C71's "Trump rejection is posture" reading into "Trump rejection + Netanyahu re-affirmation = dual public re-escalation track." The backchannel narrowing (ToI: "closing in on framework") still persists, but the public posture has fully shifted from "diplomacy active" to "diplomacy contested."

1. HMS Dragon mission reframed as "strictly defensive" — mine clearance focus. Healey's narrower public framing (mine clearance + vessel protection) is calibrated to partially defuse Iran's "extra-regional destroyers" threat. The coalition can advance the actual capability build (RFA Lyme Bay MCM mothership in Gibraltar) under a softer public frame. "The moment it is needed" precondition signals the coalition is not yet authorized to deploy — it is preparing while consulting. 40-nation meeting today is consultation, not authorization.

1. CIA assessment: Iran can outlast Trump's blockade for months. Surfaced from WaPo May 7 reporting, this intelligence read materially anchors the duration lock on the longer end of the IRGC's 6-month war framing. The economic-pressure model (blockade + sanctions + SPR) is calibrated against an opponent with longer endurance than baseline assumed. C71's "duration lock tightening" is reinforced.

1. HEU nuance: dilution + transfer, not just transfer. WSJ via Al Jazeera surfaces the structural detail — Iran offered to dilute its HEU stockpile AND transfer part to a third country. Enrichment moratorium offered for "a period shorter than 20 years" (US demands 12-15 years minimum). HEU return clause if US withdraws. 30-day nuclear negotiation window. The gap between "dilute + transfer + sub-20yr moratorium" (Iran) and "12-15yr enrichment moratorium + dismantlement" (US) is now precisely specified. The dilution offer is a more substantive concession than C71's framing recognized.

1. Iran internal opposition flagged. FT/WSJ: a hardline faction in Iran is actively sabotaging a potential deal — sharing Trump's view that the 2015 JCPOA was a mistake but for different reasons. "Regime efforts to appease have so far failed." This adds a domestic constraint to the duration lock: even if the negotiating team wants a deal, the internal faction can block it.

1. Ras Laffan repair timeline formalized: 2-4yr replacement turbine lead times; $20bn/year revenue loss. The engineering constraint that makes Ras Laffan recovery years-long, not months, is now precisely specified. Trains 4 & 6 face replacement turbine lead times of 2-4 years. Annual revenue loss $20bn. Long-term force majeure declared to China, S.Korea, Italy, Belgium. This is the structural anchor for the Energy Infrastructure lock: irreversible within any plausible ceasefire timeline.

1. South Korea: first domestic fuel price cap in nearly 30 years. New emergency measure category. Korean Air entered "emergency mode." Nuclear utilization target 80%. Coal limits lifted. The cascade of policy moves indicates Korea has crossed from "managed disruption" to "structural emergency posture."

1. UN April 7 veto background surfaced. Bahraini-drafted UNSC Hormuz resolution vetoed by China + Russia. UK + US backed. This is structural — it explains why the coalition is being built outside the UNSC framework. The 40-nation meeting is the alternative to UNSC authorization.

Structural Conditions — 11 Locks

Condition 1 — Price Lock — BRENT >$105 (CROSSED). $119 PEAK RETEST $14 AWAY. C71's $104.80 has now firmly broken above $105. Citi's "end-May reopening" base case is the optimistic side of the distribution; the bank explicitly notes risks skewed to delay/partial-reopening = "disruptions for longer." Sparta CEO: "$200 on crude maybe not, but $200 on products yes — humanitarian crisis poorer countries, economic crisis Europe, political crisis US." Lock status: ASCENDING — $105 BREACHED; $119 RETEST REMAINS ACTIVE THREAT.

Condition 2 — Supply Lock — 14 mb/d OFFLINE; ARAMCO BENEFICIARY (Q1 +25%); UAE EXITED OPEC. Aramco Q1 profit +25% on Hormuz→Red Sea export shift confirms the bypass infrastructure is operating at maximum; UAE's OPEC exit (Apr 30) is downstream geopolitical realignment. Iraq Basra-Haditha pipeline started May 4 but flows late 2026 earliest. Lock status: CONFIRMED — STRUCTURAL; BENEFICIARIES VISIBLE; NEW SUPPLY YEARS AWAY.

Condition 3 — Insurance Lock — P&I DAY 73+. $40B DFC (7 INSURERS NAMED). $352B PRIVATE GAP. No P&I re-entry signal. DFC structure now fully named: Chubb (lead) + AIG + Berkshire Hathaway + Travelers + Liberty Mutual + Starr + CNA. JPM: 329 vessels in Gulf × hull+liability+pollution = $352B coverage no longer privately provided. OFAC PGSA guidance: US persons forbidden from paying PGSA. Lock status: CONFIRMED — STATE-DOMINATED MARKET; PRIVATE WITHDRAWAL STRUCTURAL.

Condition 4 — Labor Lock — 22,500 SEAFARERS TRAPPED. CREW REFUSAL SYSTEMIC. Confirmed by JCS Chair Caine (May 6). No change in union advisory stance. The 40-ships-per-week (vs ~840 pre-war) traffic is the labor lock's downstream manifestation. Lock status: CONFIRMED.

Condition 5 — Duration Lock — CIA: IRAN CAN OUTLAST FOR MONTHS. IRAN HARDLINE FACTION SABOTAGING DEAL. Two structural reinforcements this cycle: (a) US intelligence read that Iran has months of endurance and (b) internal Iranian opposition that even regime appeasement cannot overcome. The duration lock is anchored long. Lock status: TIGHTENING — INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ENDURANCE CONFIRMED.

Condition 6 — Nuclear Lock — HEU DILUTION + TRANSFER OFFERED; ENRICHMENT MORATORIUM <20YR; HEU RETURN CLAUSE. Iran's offer is more substantive than C71 recognized: dilute the stockpile AND transfer part to third country. But the moratorium length (sub-20yr) is below US minimum (12-15yr at the low end). The HEU return clause if US withdraws is a strong Iranian protection but is also a US negotiating constraint. 30-day nuclear window opens. Lock status: PARTIALLY LOOSENING — DILUTION IS SUBSTANTIVE; GAP REMAINS BRIDGEABLE BUT TIGHT.

Condition 7 — Geographic Lock — NETANYAHU "WAR NOT OVER" + MULTI-FRONT MAINTAINED. Israeli rhetorical re-escalation adds a new axis to the geographic lock. War kinetically and now rhetorically active across Iran, Lebanon, Gulf states, US-Iranian naval theater, and now resuming Israeli front. Lock status: TIGHTENING — ISRAELI AXIS REACTIVATED.

Condition 8 — Capability Lock — MCM PRIMARY MISSION; COALITION FORMING (40 NATIONS); IRAN THREAT NOT WITHDRAWN. Healey's "strictly defensive" reframing narrows the coalition mandate to mine clearance + vessel protection. This is operationally meaningful (RFA Lyme Bay MCM mothership in Gibraltar) and politically calibrated (harder for Iran to publicly oppose). But the "moment it is needed" precondition and Iran's not-withdrawn destroyer threat keep the capability lock active. Lock status: PARTIALLY LOOSENING — NARROWER MANDATE; CAPABILITY PROGRESSING.

Condition 9 — Dual Chokepoint Lock — CDG IN RED SEA; HOUTHIS ACTIVE. France's Charles de Gaulle moving to Red Sea signals coalition intent to address the second chokepoint. Helium rationing globally (one-third of production impacted) is downstream cascade evidence. Lock status: CONFIRMED.

Condition 10 — Leadership Lock — GHALIBAF AS OPERATIONAL FACE; HARDLINE FACTION SABOTAGING; MOJTABA OUT OF VIEW. New element: hardline faction internal opposition is now flagged. Even regime appeasement of the faction has failed. Mojtaba Khamenei still out of public view. Decision-making remains concentrated; hardline veto power on negotiation terms is structural. Lock status: CONFIRMED + INTERNAL OPPOSITION FORMALIZED.

Condition 11 — Energy Infrastructure Lock — REPLACEMENT TURBINES 2-4YR LEAD; QATAR $20BN/YR REVENUE LOSS; FULL RESTART END-AUG EARLIEST. Ras Laffan recovery is now precisely engineered: replacement gas turbines (Trains 4 & 6) face 2-4 year lead times. Long-term force majeure to China/Korea/Italy/Belgium. $20bn annual revenue loss. Full restart end-August at earliest; pre-attack capacity not until 2031 in worst case. South Pars 12% of Iran's gas continuing degradation. Lock status: CONFIRMED — IRREVERSIBLE WITHIN ANY FORESEEABLE CEASEFIRE TIMELINE; ENGINEERING CONSTRAINT FORMALIZED.

Critical Watch (C73 triggers)

1. 40-nation coalition meeting outcome (May 11 evening/overnight) — Does the meeting produce a specific deployment timeline, an authorization framework, or only a consultation communiqué? If timeline emerges, Iran's threat is tested directly.
2. Iran response to Trump rejection + Netanyahu re-escalation — Does Iran's "reasonable" framing soften further or harden? Does the IRGC respond kinetically to either rhetorical re-escalation?
3. CIA assessment public impact — Does the "Iran can outlast for months" framing change Congressional posture on continuing US blockade indefinitely?
4. Lebanon May 14-15 Washington talks — Can they proceed with Netanyahu's "war not over" public statement? If cancelled, Iran's Lebanon linkage strategy gains weight.
5. Brent $110 threshold — If Citi's "end-May reopening" base case slips and no diplomatic surfacing in 48-72 hours, $110 is the next technical level.
6. HEU dilution feasibility — IAEA technical assessment of Iran's dilution + transfer offer. Is the dilution offer verifiable under a sub-20yr moratorium? This is the structural test of the bridgeability of the nuclear gap.
7. Iranian hardline faction visibility — Does the hardline opposition surface publicly (statements, actions) or remain a private constraint?
8. South Korea export restriction — If Korea formally restricts refined product exports, the SE Asia cascade accelerates sharply.
9. Hapag-Lloyd / Maersk / MSC re-entry signals — Major liners' first concrete re-entry signal is the leading insurance-lock loosening indicator.
10. Trump deterrence on Qatar — held? — Iran has not re-struck Qatar with named energy infrastructure since the March 18 Ras Laffan strike. Trump's "blow up entirety of South Pars" deterrence holding. If Iran restrikes (Ras Laffan, Mesaieed, North Field), deterrence has failed.

Net Assessment

C72 is the cycle where the C71 morning's binary fully crystallized into the market and the dual-public-track-with-quiet-backchannel pattern stabilized into the operating regime. Brent broke $105 (+4%). WTI cleared $99.95 (+5%). Citi's first explicit timeline assumption ("end-May reopening, risks tilted to delay") is the optimistic base case; partial reopening means "disruptions for longer." Sparta CEO's framing — "humanitarian crisis poorer countries, economic crisis Europe, political crisis US" — names the asymmetric pain function the crude price level alone obscures.

The most significant structural development is the simultaneous emergence of three reinforcements to the duration lock: (a) CIA: Iran can outlast for months; (b) Iranian hardline faction sabotaging deal — even regime appeasement failing; (c) Netanyahu: "war not over" — Israeli rhetorical re-escalation. These are three independent endurance/escalation signals from three different sources. The economic-pressure model is calibrated against an opponent with longer endurance than baseline assumed, while the Israeli axis is rhetorically reactivating and the negotiating partner has an internal veto faction. None of these can be resolved by a single diplomatic exchange.

The HEU "dilution + transfer" detail is the cycle's most under-priced positive signal. Dilution of the stockpile (not just transfer) is a substantively more concrete concession than transfer alone. The gap between Iran's "dilute + transfer + sub-20yr moratorium" and US "12-15yr enrichment moratorium" is now precisely specified — and at the technical level it is bridgeable, particularly if dilution is verifiable. The 30-day nuclear negotiation window inside the broader framework gives the technical bridge time to be constructed. But the public-track rejection and the internal Iranian opposition limit how far the bridge can travel.

HMS Dragon's "strictly defensive" reframing is the cycle's most operationally significant coalition development. The narrower public mandate (mine clearance + vessel protection) makes the deployment politically defensible while preserving the capability build (RFA Lyme Bay MCM mothership in Gibraltar). The 40-nation meeting today is consultation, not authorization. The coalition can advance under the new frame; whether Iran's not-withdrawn destroyer threat triggers when an actual MCM operation begins is the next collision point. The capability lock is the only lock partially loosening this cycle — but loosening only under the precondition that Iran's threat does not test the new frame kinetically.

The Energy Infrastructure lock is the structural anchor of the crisis. Ras Laffan replacement turbines: 2-4 year lead times. $20bn/year Qatar revenue loss. Full restart end-August at earliest. Pre-attack capacity not until 2031 in worst case. Long-term force majeure declared to China/Korea/Italy/Belgium. South Pars: 12% of Iran's gas continuing degradation. Whatever ceasefire is signed, the energy infrastructure damage outlasts it by years. The crisis has a duration lock built into the physics of gas-turbine manufacturing.

Revised probability distribution (C72):

• Path D+ (sustained escalation in ceasefire wrapper): ~36% (+1%: Netanyahu re-escalation + CIA endurance read + Iran hardline veto = ceasefire wrapper thinner)
• Path B (full kinetic): ~22% (stable: HMS Dragon "strictly defensive" reframing partially defuses; CIA "months" assessment makes near-term US escalation less likely; offset by Netanyahu signal)
• Path A' (narrow Hormuz deal + 30-day window): ~21% (+1%: HEU dilution offer is more substantive than C71 recognized; nuclear gap bridgeable at technical level)
• Path E (deal signed, phased reopening): ~10% (stable)
• Path C (indefinite siege): ~6% (−2%: Citi "end-May" base case implies markets give some weight to resolution; some institutional capture risk remains)
• Path F (deal signed, collapses on implementation): ~5% (stable)

Sources (C72 new)

Prices / Markets

• Brent crosses $105 — HDFC Sky
• Oil price today: Brent, WTI rise on Iran war worries — CNBC
• Brent crude — Trading Economics
• Asian shares mixed; oil jumps 3% — Yahoo Finance

Diplomacy / Iran Response / Nuclear

• Iran replies "reasonable"; Trump "unacceptable" — CNN live updates
• What we know about Iran's response — Al Jazeera
• Iran 14-point proposal — Al Jazeera
• Iran response via Pakistan — Al Jazeera
• One page, fourteen points, no deal — The National
• House of Commons Library: Iran ceasefire & nuclear talks
• 2026 Iran war ceasefire — Wikipedia
• 2025-2026 Iran-US negotiations — Wikipedia

CIA / Trump Threats / Coalition

• CIA assessment: Iran can outlast Trump's blockade for months — WaPo
• Trump threatens intense bombing — WaPo
• Trump: "much higher level" — CNBC
• UK HMS Dragon "strictly defensive" — Naval News
• UK Type-45 redeployed — The Defense News

Strait Operational / PGSA / Traffic

• PGSA explainer — The Week (Indian)
• IRGC: passage to be ensured — Al Jazeera
• IRGC designated routes — GlobalSecurity.org
• Iran sets transit process; shipowners wary — Insurance Journal
• 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis — Wikipedia
• Hormuz live tracker
• UN: ceasefire extension fragile — UN News

Tanker Attacks / UKMTO

• UKMTO recent incidents
• UKMTO JMIC Advisory Note 05 May (Update 041)
• Qatar drone attack May 9 (UKMTO 056-26) — Prism News
• Drone strikes tanker attacks shake fragile truce — Trans Asia News Service

Insurance / DFC / Lloyd's

• Strait of Hormuz Insurance Market — Strauss Center
• DFC $20B initial — DFC press release
• DFC $40B confirmation; 7 insurers — Eagle Intel Mari
• WEF: governments as insurers of last resort
• Irregular Warfare Journal: insurance weapon
• Howden Re Hormuz report March 2026
• VLCC rates double-digit millions — IBTimes / Lloyd's List frame

Bypass / Pipelines / Iraq / Aramco

• Saudi East-West Pipeline restored — Bloomberg
• Saudi maxes E-W Pipeline — Pipeline Technology Journal
• Iraq $1.5B pipeline project May 4 — NextBigFuture
• 5 pipelines that bypass Hormuz — TheBoard

Energy Infrastructure / Ras Laffan / South Pars

• Ras Laffan not back online for months — The National
• South Pars Strike — Stimson Center
• 2026 South Pars field attack — Wikipedia
• North Field expansion delays — Natural Gas Intel
• Ras Laffan attacks discovery alert

Asia Crisis / SE Asia / Country Response

• OSAC Asia bulletin: fuel shortage impacts
• IEA energy crisis policy response tracker
• Modern Diplomacy: how Asian countries are responding
• 2026 Iran war fuel crisis — Wikipedia
• Marketplace: some countries cling, others ration
• SE Asia shuts offices, limits travel — Al Jazeera

Red Sea / Houthis / Dual Chokepoint

• Red Sea crisis — Wikipedia
• Houthis maritime vulnerability 2026 — Eurasia Review

SPR / EIA

• EIA Today in Energy: SPR & global oil inventories
• EIA: 17.5M bbl released from SPR since March
• Bloomberg: US to release 172M bbl
• Global strategic petroleum reserves — Wikipedia

Shadow Fleet / OFAC

• Treasury Economic Fury (Apr 24)
• OFAC shadow fleet — Windward
• Treasury: maximum pressure shadow fleet
• US sanctions 29 vessels — The Hill

UNSC / Diplomacy Framework

• UN April 7 veto — UN News
• House of Commons: reopening Strait of Hormuz
• Has US accepted Iran's demand Hormuz first, nuclear later — Al Jazeera

IEA Reports

• IEA Oil Market Report April 14, 2026
• IEA Oil Market Report March 12, 2026

Run completed 2026-05-11 afternoon (Day 73). Scheduled cron run — terminal substrate. Grok bridge: NO — full 13-topic sweep. Baseline C71 (2026-05-11.md) → C72 delta. Key C72 deltas: (1) Brent crossed $105 (+4%); WTI $99.95 (+5%); markets fully priced rejection. (2) Netanyahu: "war is not over" — first explicit Israeli re-escalation since Apr 8. (3) HMS Dragon reframed "strictly defensive" — mine clearance primary mission; 40-nation meeting today; "moment it is needed" precondition. (4) CIA assessment surfaced: Iran can outlast blockade "for months." (5) HEU "dilution + transfer" detail; enrichment moratorium "shorter than 20 years"; HEU return clause; 30-day nuclear window. (6) Iranian hardline faction sabotaging deal — regime appeasement failing. (7) Ras Laffan repair timeline formalized: replacement turbines 2-4yr lead; $20bn/yr Qatar revenue loss; full restart end-August earliest. (8) South Korea: FIRST DOMESTIC FUEL PRICE CAP ~30 YEARS. (9) UN April 7 veto background surfaced (China + Russia, Bahraini-drafted; UK + US backed). (10) Citi: end-May reopening base case, risks tilted to delay; "disruptions for longer." (11) Aramco Q1 profit +25% (beneficiary). Path: D+ 36% (+1%), B 22% (stable), A' 21% (+1%), E 10% (stable), C 6% (−2%), F 5% (stable). C72 frame: THREE-AXIS DURATION-LOCK REINFORCEMENT — CIA + HARDLINERS + NETANYAHU. NUCLEAR GAP PRECISELY SPECIFIED, BRIDGEABLE BUT TIGHT. COALITION CAPABILITY NARROWING MANDATE WHILE IRAN THREAT HOLDS. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE LOCK ENGINEERING-BOUND (2-4YR TURBINE LEAD). Risk: EXTREME — CRITICAL.

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