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Series: hormuz · Cycle 62 · Next →

Hormuz Crisis Tracker — 2026-05-06 · Evening Cycle

⚠️ ACTIVE CLOCKS (C62 status)

Clock	Start	Status	Trigger
48-hour MOU response	May 6	DAY 1 OF 2 — Iran "reviewing"; response via Pakistan by ~May 8	Iran accepts/rejects/counters
IRGC no-attack window	May 6 ~afternoon	HOLDING — zero new attacks since safe passage statement	First attack = statement was tactical
Mine clearance	Project Freedom	10-100 cleared; Avengers in transit; weeks/months to full	P&I re-entry
France coalition activation	CDG south of Suez	CONDITIONAL — needs threat reduction + P&I; NOT yet active	P&I re-entry signal
Congressional war powers	—	~4 days (May 11-12)	Deal acceptance before deadline

Top-line movers (4 — C61→C62 delta)

IRGC NO-ATTACK POSTURE HOLDING (C61→C62 window) — No new tanker attacks or maritime incidents reported between the afternoon cycle and this evening sweep. Running total holds at 75. The IRGC's safe passage statement from C61 has not been tested by a commercial vessel, but it has also not been contradicted by a new attack. This is the first multi-hour no-attack window since the statement. One data point, not a pattern. JMIC still rates the Strait as CRITICAL as of May 5. Insurance market is not moving.

QATAR LNG FORCE MAJEURE EXTENDED THROUGH MID-JUNE — CONFIRMED (May 4, Bloomberg/gCaptain/Rigzone) — QatarEnergy extended force majeure on LNG supply through mid-June. This is now confirmed as an extension, not just an ongoing status. Two of Qatar's 14 LNG trains + one gas-to-liquids facility are damaged; 12.8 million tonnes/year of LNG offline for three to five years (repair timeline). EU gas storage sits at 34.14% as of May 4 — well below seasonal norms. The dual chokepoint lock (Lock #9) is tightening through June regardless of deal outcome: even if Hormuz opens politically, Qatar's damaged infrastructure will not be repaired within the MOU's 30-day window.

LLOYD'S LIST: WAR RISK PREMIUMS EXCEEDING DOUBLE-DIGIT MILLIONS PER TRIP (C62 web sweep) — Lloyd's List reported war risk premiums are "topping double-digit millions of dollars per trip" for Gulf transits. This is higher than the $3-8M range cited in C61's Albany Antree/Caixin sources (which cited per-hull value % rates for some vessel classes). Likely difference: large VLCC or supertanker vs. smaller vessel transit costs. Both figures may be correct for different vessel classes. Flagged as a range discrepancy — the upper end of commercial transit cost is materially higher than C61's estimate implied.

UNSC PREVIOUS RESOLUTION VETOED BY CHINA AND RUSSIA — APRIL (C62 web sweep confirmation) — Search results clarified that a prior "watered-down" UNSC resolution on Hormuz was vetoed by China AND Russia hours before the April 8 ceasefire announcement. This means the current US+Gulf co-sponsored resolution (Rubio, May 5) faces the same probable outcome. Iran's UN mission rejection of the current draft as "politically motivated" (Grok X-pulse, C62 in-context) aligns with this pattern. The UNSC track is a pressure instrument, not a resolution mechanism. Russia and China veto will predictably kill it.

GROK X-PULSE SIGNALS — FLAGGED UNCONFIRMED (17:30 UTC)

Two signals from the Grok X-pulse (in-context, Grok X-native OSINT) were NOT confirmed by structured web search in this sweep. Per protocol: flag, do not incorporate into baseline until confirmed.

Signal	Grok source	Web sweep	Status
F-18 from USS Abraham Lincoln fired on Iranian tanker Hasna (blockade breach attempt, ignored warnings)	@KORRINA31535546 / CENTCOM claim	NOT CONFIRMED — no web search result, no CENTCOM press release, no Reuters/AP pick-up	UNCONFIRMED — HOLD
Kharg Island ships leaking oil	@SplutC OSINT	NOT CONFIRMED — no web search result corroborating	UNCONFIRMED — HOLD

If either is confirmed in C63, add to tanker attack log and update Kharg Island as CRITICAL ESCALATION (Kharg handles ~90% of Iranian crude exports). The Hasna incident, if real, would be the first US kinetic action against an Iranian vessel during the Project Freedom pause — significant.

1. Conflict status — DAY 68 / CEASEFIRE DAY 29 (48-HOUR MOU CLOCK; IRGC HOLDING; FRANCE CDG POSITIONED)

Parameter	C61	C62	Δ
War day	68	68	same day
Ceasefire day	29	29	same day
Ceasefire status	DEAL ACCELERATION — IRGC reversal + MOU crystallized	48-HOUR CLOCK — Day 1 of 2; Iran "reviewing"; IRGC no-attack posture holding	CLOCK RUNNING
MOU status	14-point crystallized; 48-hour response window	Iran reviewing; >10yr moratorium (official formulation); Iran's own 14-pt counter (May 2) → merged framework	CONFIRMED + CLARIFIED
IRGC no-attack	C61: 0 attacks since statement	HOLDING — still 0 new attacks C61→C62; no commercial transit tested	HOLDING (one window)
France CDG	South of Suez; 50+ coalition	Unchanged — conditional on P&I/threat reduction; NOT activated	STALE — CONDITIONAL
China signal	Post-Araghchi; crystallizing 24-48h	Still pending — no Wang Yi statement on deal yet	GHOST — DAY 2
Congressional war powers	~5 days	~4 days (May 11-12)	TICKING

2. Strait operational status — IRGC VERBAL HOLDS; NO TRANSIT; JMIC STILL CRITICAL

Parameter	C61	C62	Δ
IRGC posture	"SAFE PASSAGE WILL BE PROVIDED" — verbal; no details	VERBAL HOLDS — zero attacks C61→C62; "new procedures" still undefined	HOLDING — UNTESTED
Commercial transit	Zero under IRGC offer	Still zero — no vessel has tested the IRGC statement	GHOST CONFIRMED
JMIC risk rating	CRITICAL (May 5)	CRITICAL (May 5 — most recent available)	STALE — CONFIRMED
Transit data	11 transits May 4 (5 in, 6 out)	No new transit count data for May 6; C61 data held	STALE
Mine clearance	10-100 cleared; Avengers in transit	Progress unchanged in C62 window; Germany minesweeper en route	STALE
P&I response	Zero (day 61)	Zero (day 62) — NO MOVEMENT	DAY 62 ABSENCE
"New procedures"	UNDEFINED	STILL UNDEFINED	GHOST — CRITICAL

3. Tanker attacks log — RUNNING TOTAL 75 (UNCHANGED — IRGC HOLDING NO-ATTACK POSTURE)

No new maritime/infrastructure events confirmed in C62 sweep. Running total holds at 75.

GROK UNCONFIRMED (pending C63 verification):

F-18/USS Abraham Lincoln vs. Iranian tanker Hasna (blockade breach attempt) — if confirmed, add as C62 entry
Kharg Island ships leaking oil — if confirmed, flag as CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (Iran's primary crude export terminal)

Pattern note: Zero attacks in the C61→C62 window is the longest confirmed no-attack interval since the IRGC safe passage statement. Still insufficient to declare a pattern. One cycle.

4. Oil prices — BRENT $106.52 (MORNING); GROK EVENING SIGNAL ~$102-106; CONTINUED DEAL TRADE

Benchmark	C61	C62	Δ
Brent	$106.52	$106.52 confirmed (8:30am ET); Grok X-pulse 17:30 UTC: ~$102-106 range	CONTINUED DECLINE (evening)
WTI	Futures –9% below $93	Futures –9% below $93 (confirmed); no new close data	CONFIRMED
Price driver	Amplified hope trade (IRGC reversal + MOU 48-hr window)	IRGC no-attack holding = sustained deal pricing; 100% sentiment	MAINTAINED
Structural floor	Ruwais offline; bypass GAP 11-12M	UNCHANGED — no physical supply change	UNCHANGED
Brent $100 watch	NEW — approaching $105	Active — $100 psychological in range if deal closes	ACTIVE
Snapback risk	$115+ if deal collapses	UNCHANGED — IRGC "new procedures" undefined; snapback risk elevated	UNCHANGED

5. SPR — NO NEW DATA; EU GAS STORAGE 34.14% (NEW)

Parameter	C61	C62	Δ
US SPR level	~409M bbl (April 10)	~409M bbl — STALE; EIA plans update in May STEO	STALE
IEA 400M bbl	In delivery; 120-day window	Delivery confirmed ongoing; US portion: 172M bbl	CONFIRMED
SPR runway	~6-7 days at gap rate	Unchanged math	STALE
EU gas storage	N/A in C61	NEW — 34.14% as of May 4 (EU underground storage); well below seasonal norm	NEW — EUROPEAN ENERGY PRESSURE

EU gas 34.14%: Qatar LNG extension through mid-June is squeezing European energy security independent of any Hormuz deal timeline. Even if Hormuz opens, Qatar's damaged LNG infrastructure (3-5yr repair) leaves Europe short on LNG for multiple winters. This is a structural risk that outlasts the current crisis arc.

6. Bypass infrastructure — STALE; BASRA-HADITHA CONFIRMED; SAUDI 7M BPD CLAIM DISCREPANCY

Route	Capacity	Status	Δ vs C61
Saudi E-W Pipeline	~7M bpd claimed (Saudi); ~4.5M effective (Yanbu port cap)	At capacity	DISCREPANCY FLAGGED — Saudi claims 7M bpd through pipeline; Yanbu port cap ~4.5M bpd; effective capacity ≤4.5M
UAE ADCOP	~1.5-1.8M nameplate	Ruwais + Fujairah both compromised; near-zero effective	unchanged
Kirkuk-Ceyhan	~250-600K bpd	Final inspection; July 27 expiry	unchanged
Iraq Basra-Haditha	2.25-2.5M planned	Construction started May 1; flows late 2026/early 2027	unchanged
Cape of Good Hope	+15-20 days	All major carriers rerouted	unchanged
GAP metric	~11-12M bpd	~11-12M bpd UNCHANGED	unchanged

Saudi pipeline discrepancy: Saudi claimed 7M bpd pipeline pumping in March; Yanbu port physical capacity is ~4.5M bpd. ENR (C62 sweep): "Bypass infrastructure was sized for a short disruption. This is not that." Effective bypass below Saudi headline claim.

7. Insurance — P&I DAY 62 ABSENCE; LLOYD'S LIST WAR RISK REVISED UPWARD

Parameter	C61	C62	Δ
P&I re-entry	Zero (day 61)	Zero (day 62)	DAY 62 ABSENCE — NO RESPONSE
War risk premium	3-8% range (Albany Antree/Caixin)	"Double-digit millions per trip" (Lloyd's List) — implies $10M+ for large tankers; 3-8% range may apply to mid-sized vessels	RANGE WIDENED UPWARD
JMIC classification	CRITICAL (May 5)	CRITICAL (May 5 — most recent)	STALE — CONFIRMED
Mine gate	10-100 cleared	Progress unchanged; full clearance weeks/months	STALE
DFC reinsurance	$40B active	Active	CONFIRMED
France coalition condition	Needs P&I re-entry	Coalition explicitly conditional — "maritime industry reassured enough to use the strait"	CONFIRMED — P&I IS THE GATE
P&I re-entry sequence	Step 1 (IRGC verbal)	STILL AT STEP 1 — verbal → mine clearance → transit demonstrated → P&I	STEP 1 ONLY

P&I absence on day 62 is the single most important number in this cycle. IRGC said ships can pass. The market replied: silence.

8. Shadow fleet / sanctions — MAY 1 OFAC; 36 GHOST ARMADA TANKERS ACTIVE

Item	Status	Δ vs C61
Total shadow fleet	1,400+ vessels; ~430 Iranian	unchanged
OFAC May 1	NEW FUSION designated + 3 FX exchange houses	CONFIRMED — UANI Ghost Armada tracking
Ghost Armada activity	May 4: 36 tankers near EOPL + AIS active	NEW — 3 STS transfers in satellite imagery; shadow fleet operational despite sanctions
"Economic Fury"	Treasury sb0472	Ongoing
UANI Ghost Armada	Active tracking	36 tankers anchored/loitering near EOPL May 4; 3+ STS transfers

9. Country matrix — STALE EXCEPT UNSC CONTEXT

Country	Status	Signal	Δ vs C61
US	48-hour window; demining continues	UNCHANGED — awaiting Iran response; congressional clock ~4 days	CLOCK –1 DAY
Iran	"Reviewing" MOU; IRGC holding	Still reviewing; IRGC zero attacks C61→C62; "new procedures" undefined	CLOCK RUNNING
China	Post-Araghchi meeting; crystallizing	STILL PENDING — no Wang Yi statement on deal	GHOST DAY 2
Russia	Background	C62 clarified: Russia co-vetoed April UNSC resolution with China; current resolution faces same fate	NEW CONTEXT
France	CDG south of Suez	Unchanged — conditional; not activated	STALE
Germany	Minesweeper deploying	En route; unchanged	STALE
UAE	Absorbing; OPEC exit	No new attacks since IRGC statement; retaliation probability reduced	REDUCED PRESSURE
Qatar	LNG force majeure	EXTENDED through mid-June (confirmed)	TIGHTENING
EU	Energy pressure	Gas storage 34.14% — below seasonal norm; Qatar LNG extension through mid-June squeezes supply	NEW — EU VULNERABLE
Japan	263M bbl; burning ¥300B/month	STALE	carried
India	Safe passage; coal buffer	STALE	carried
SE Asia	Rationing cascade	STALE	carried

10. Policy log (C62 additions — May 6 evening)

May 6 (evening sweep) — UNSC CONTEXT: PRIOR RESOLUTION VETOED BY CHINA + RUSSIA IN EARLY APRIL — Clarified that the previous Hormuz UNSC resolution was vetoed hours before the April 8 ceasefire. Current US+Gulf co-sponsored resolution faces identical fate. Russia and China veto expected. Iran UN mission rejection (Grok X-pulse) consistent. UNSC track = pressure instrument, not resolution mechanism.
May 4 — QATAR LNG FORCE MAJEURE EXTENDED THROUGH MID-JUNE — Bloomberg confirmed. Two LNG trains + one GTL facility offline; 3-5yr repair; 12.8M tonnes/yr lost.
All other C62 policy items STALE from C61 — see C61 for full policy log

11. Metrics dashboard — C62 (evening)

Metric	C61	C62	Δ
War day	68	68	same
Ceasefire day	29	29	same
Ceasefire status	DEAL ACCELERATION	48-HOUR CLOCK DAY 1	CLOCKED
IRGC posture	"SAFE PASSAGE" — verbal	VERBAL HOLDING — zero attacks C61→C62	HOLDING
Maritime/infrastructure events	75	75 (2 unconfirmed from Grok)	unchanged
Brent	$106.52	$106.52 morning; ~$102-106 Grok evening	CONTINUED DECLINE
WTI	Futures –9% below $93	Confirmed; no new close	CONFIRMED
P&I absence	Day 61	Day 62 — NO MOVEMENT	+1 DAY
Mine clearance	Progress	No update; stale	STALE
France coalition	Ready/conditional	Conditional — not activated	STALE
48-hour clock	Started May 6	DAY 1 OF 2 — response by ~May 8	–1 DAY
China signal	Pending	Still pending — ghost day 2	GHOST
Qatar LNG	Force majeure	EXTENDED mid-June (confirmed)	TIGHTENING
EU gas storage	N/A	34.14% (May 4)	NEW — LOW
War risk premium	$3-8M per trip	"Double-digit millions" per trip (Lloyd's List) — large vessels	REVISED HIGHER
UNSC current resolution	Vote pending	Russia + China veto expected (prior resolution precedent)	NEW CONTEXT
Path A'	25%	~26%	+1% — IRGC holding no-attack posture
Path E	18%	~18%	unchanged
Path D+	30%	~29%	–1%
Path B	15%	~15%	unchanged
Bypass GAP	~11-12M bpd	~11-12M bpd	unchanged
Congressional clock	~5 days	~4 days	–1 DAY

12. Structural locks — C62 assessment

Active changes this cycle:

#9 Dual chokepoint lock — TIGHTENING. Qatar LNG force majeure extended through mid-June (confirmed). EU gas storage at 34.14% — below seasonal norm. Two LNG trains + GTL facility offline for 3-5 years. Hormuz deal does not fix Qatar's physical infrastructure. Europe's energy exposure through LNG channel extends beyond any near-term deal timeline. Lock #9 is the longest-duration lock in the model — Ras Laffan damage outlasts the war regardless of outcome.

#3 Insurance lock — DAY 62 — STRONGEST SIGNAL IN THE CRISIS. War risk premiums revised upward: "double-digit millions per trip" (Lloyd's List) for large vessels, vs. $3-8M cited in prior cycles (which applied to mid-sized vessels). The number is now bigger AND the absence more conspicuous. France's 50+ nation coalition is explicitly conditional on "maritime industry reassured enough to use the strait." P&I re-entry is the gate to the coalition, not just the market. Everything waits for insurance.

#5 Duration lock — 48-HOUR CLOCK SOFTENING. Iran is reviewing the MOU. IRGC holding no-attack posture. Clearest softening signal in the duration lock since the war began. If Iran accepts within 48 hours → duration lock resolves. If Iran counters or stalls → duration lock hardens.

#10 Leadership lock — IRGC HOLDING CONFIRMS C61'S PARTIAL RESOLUTION THESIS. Zero attacks C61→C62 is consistent with the Supreme Leader having directed IRGC compliance. One window is not proof — but it is consistent with the thesis. Lock status: SOFTENING (sustained from C61).

#8 Capability lock — STALE. No new mine clearance data. Avengers still in transit. Germany minesweeper en route. Status unchanged from C61.

All other locks: STALE — no material change in one evening cycle.

13. Convergence assessment

C61 frame: THE IRGC REVERSAL — STRAIT OPENED IN WORDS; CLOSED IN MINES.
C62 frame: THE CLOCK RUNS CLEAN — WORDS HOLDING, PHYSICS UNCHANGED.

The evening sweep finds the crisis in an unusual posture: the expected signals are absent. No new attacks. No IRGC "new procedures" disclosure. No Beijing signal. No P&I movement. No commercial vessel transit. The IRGC made a verbal offer in the afternoon (C61) and has not contradicted it with action in the evening (C62). That is not enough to call the offer genuine, but it is consistent with a directed no-attack posture while the 48-hour clock runs.

The MOU architecture is clarified by C62's sweep. Iran submitted its own 14-point counter-proposal on May 2 (NPR). The one-page MOU reported by Axios on May 6 is the merged/negotiated product of that exchange — not a US unilateral demand. This is structurally different: when both sides have submitted 14-point positions and are converging on a single-page framework, the negotiation is in its closing phase, not its opening phase. The "reviewing" posture from Iran's FM spokesperson is standard pre-acceptance language, not a rejection signal.

Qatar's LNG extension confirms Lock #9 is the war's longest tail. Even if an MOU is signed May 8, even if Hormuz reopens by June, even if mines are cleared by July — Qatar's LNG trains are offline for three to five years. EU gas storage at 34.14% is below the levels that triggered the 2021-22 European energy crisis. The Hormuz crisis resolves into a European energy crisis regardless of the deal outcome. This is the structural consequence that outlasts the ceasefire headline.

The UNSC track is theater. China and Russia co-vetoed the previous Hormuz resolution in April — hours before the ceasefire. The current resolution is a pressure instrument, not a diplomatic mechanism. Iran will reject it publicly (confirmed). China and Russia will veto it (predicted by precedent). The track exists to signal to Gulf partners and the domestic US audience, not to produce a resolution. It runs in parallel to the MOU track without affecting it.

Insurance is still the test. P&I day 62 absence is now confirmed at a higher implied premium level than prior cycles. Lloyd's List's "double-digit millions per trip" for large tankers means VLCCs and supertankers face costs that make transits economically marginal without a clear risk-reduction signal. The France coalition explicitly requires "maritime industry reassured enough to use the strait" before activating. This means the 50+ nation escort capability — which could physically enable reopening — is locked behind the same insurance gate. The sequence remains: IRGC verbal → sustained no-attack → mine clearance → demonstrated transit → P&I re-entry → coalition activation → commercial reopening. We are between steps 1 and 2.

Grok's unconfirmed signals (F-18/Hasna, Kharg Island) require C63 verification. The Hasna incident — if confirmed — would mean the US conducted kinetic action against an Iranian vessel during the Project Freedom pause, which would complicate the MOU narrative. Kharg Island leaking oil — if confirmed — would be a CRITICAL ESCALATION (Kharg = 90% of Iranian crude exports; compromise to that facility changes the supply math fundamentally). Neither was confirmed by structured web search. Both are flagged. C63 must resolve these.

Revised probability distribution (C62):

Path A' (Narrow Hormuz deal + 30-day window): ~26% (↑1% from C61). IRGC holding no-attack posture through one evening adds marginal support to deal track.

Path E (Deal signed, phased reopening): ~18% (unchanged). Awaiting 48-hour response. Physical timeline unchanged.

Path D+ (Sustained escalation in ceasefire wrapper): ~29% (↓1%). IRGC quiet posture reduces D+ probability marginally.

Path B (Full kinetic): ~15% (unchanged). Trump threat remains; IRGC alignment with deal reduces near-term risk.

Path C (Indefinite siege): ~10% (unchanged).

Path F (Deal signed, collapses on implementation): ~2% (unchanged). Hormuz-first sequencing risk persists.

Net assessment: C62 is a consolidation cycle — the C61 structural signals are holding rather than shifting. The IRGC's verbal reversal appears to be sustained through one evening window. The 48-hour MOU clock is running cleanly (Day 1 of 2). The structural impediments — mine gate, P&I absence, "new procedures" undefined, Ruwais still offline — are unchanged. Qatar's LNG extension through mid-June adds to the duration lock. The next 18 hours (by morning May 7) will clarify whether China's position on the deal is supportive or neutralizing — that signal is overdue (ghost day 2). By May 8, Iran's response to the MOU will determine whether this cycle's cautious optimism was warranted or premature. C63 must confirm or deny Grok's unconfirmed signals.

Risk level: EXTREME — CRITICAL — 48-HOUR CLOCK CYCLE (IRAN REVIEWING MOU; IRGC HOLDING NO-ATTACK POSTURE — ONE WINDOW; CHARLES DE GAULLE SOUTH OF SUEZ — CONDITIONAL; QATAR LNG EXTENDED MID-JUNE; EU GAS 34.14%; P&I DAY 62 — ZERO MOVEMENT; JMIC CRITICAL CONFIRMED; UNSC VETO EXPECTED (RUSSIA+CHINA PRECEDENT); GROK UNCONFIRMED: HASNA INCIDENT + KHARG LEAK — VERIFY C63; BRENT ~$102-106 (EVENING); WTI –9% BELOW $93; BYPASS GAP 11-12M BPD UNCHANGED; RUWAIS STILL OFFLINE; PATH A' 26%; PATH D+ 29%; PATH E 18%; DAY 68)

14. Watchlist — C63 triggers (May 7 morning)

Iran MOU response (by May 8) — Accepts, rejects, or counters. This is the binary that determines whether C61's "highest deal probability since war started" becomes a signed framework.
F-18/Hasna incident confirmation — If confirmed, adds to attack log AND creates new narrative tension: US kinetic action during Project Freedom pause. If denied by CENTCOM, close the signal.
Kharg Island oil leak — If confirmed, CRITICAL ESCALATION flag. Kharg handles ~90% of Iranian crude exports. Any operational disruption changes supply math fundamentally.
Beijing / Wang Yi statement — China's post-Araghchi position on deal endorsement. Day 2 of ghost clock. Overdue.
IRGC "new procedures" disclosure — What does safe passage mean in practice? Tolls? IRGC inspections? Uncontrolled transit? Disclosure = ground truth.
Commercial vessel transit attempt — First ship testing IRGC's offer. Unmolested = real. Attacked = tactical.
P&I movement — Any club or Lloyd's response to sustained no-attack window. Day 62 absence is the ground truth; any change is the primary signal.
EU gas storage update — 34.14% as of May 4; next update will show trajectory.
Congressional war powers (May 11-12) — 4 days; deal acceptance before deadline = moot. No deal = constitutional clock.
Avenger-class arrival timeline — When do the two minesweepers from Japan arrive? Their arrival is the first physical upgrade to demining capability.

15. Sources (C62 new — builds on C61 source list)

Strait / Transit

Insurance

Qatar LNG

UN / Diplomatic

MOU / Deal

Oil Prices

Shadow Fleet / Sanctions

Bypass / Infrastructure

Energy Infrastructure

Run completed 2026-05-06 evening (Day 68 Evening). Terminal substrate — CronCreate scheduled run. Grok bridge: NO (full sweep); Grok X-pulse 17:30 UTC available in-context (supplementary; unconfirmed items flagged). Full 13-topic sweep. Baseline C61 → C62 gap ~hours (same day). Key C62 deltas: (1) IRGC NO-ATTACK POSTURE HOLDING — zero attacks C61→C62; running total 75 unchanged; (2) QATAR LNG FORCE MAJEURE EXTENDED THROUGH MID-JUNE — confirmed; 3-5yr repair; 12.8M tonnes/yr offline; (3) EU GAS STORAGE 34.14% — below seasonal norm; (4) LLOYD'S LIST war risk "double-digit millions per trip" — higher end confirmed; (5) UNSC PRIOR RESOLUTION VETOED by China+Russia April — current vote same fate; (6) IRAN'S OWN 14-POINT COUNTER (May 2) → merged framework = MOU; (7) MOU moratorium officially ">10yr"; (8) GROK OSINT UNCONFIRMED: F-18/Hasna + Kharg Island leak — flag for C63; (9) P&I DAY 62 — zero movement; (10) 48-HOUR CLOCK = DAY 1 OF 2. Path: A' 26% (+1%), D+ 29% (–1%), E 18% (unchanged), B 15% (unchanged). C62 frame: THE CLOCK RUNS CLEAN — WORDS HOLDING, PHYSICS UNCHANGED. Risk: EXTREME — CRITICAL.

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