Hormuz Crisis Tracker — 2026-05-02 · Afternoon Cycle

Top-line movers (5 — C56→C57 delta)

1. OFAC SANCTIONS ALERT: PAYING IRAN FOR HORMUZ PASSAGE NOW SANCTIONABLE (May 1-2, OFAC/WaPo/Bloomberg/CBC/USNews/multiple) — OFAC posted an alert warning U.S. and non-U.S. persons that paying Iran "tolls" for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz exposes them to sanctions. The alert is explicit about payment forms: fiat currency, digital assets, offsets, informal swaps, and "in-kind payments" including charitable donations to the Iranian Red Crescent Society, Bonyad Mostazafan, or Iranian embassy accounts. This closes a loophole that some shipping firms were exploiting — Iran had been offering safe passage through routes closer to its shore in exchange for fees. The OFAC alert transforms what was a gray-zone commercial arrangement into a black-letter sanctions violation. The strategic effect: any ship that transits the strait by cooperating with Iran is now potentially sanctionable by the US, while any ship that transits without Iranian cooperation faces attack from Iran. The strait is now DOUBLY LOCKED — kinetically by Iran (attacks on uncooperating vessels) and legally by the US (sanctions on cooperating vessels). There is NO compliant path through the strait. This is the most complete closure mechanism yet: you can't go through without Iran's permission, and you can't get Iran's permission without US sanctions exposure.

1. LEBANON: 41 KILLED IN 24 HOURS — DEADLIEST DAY DURING "CEASEFIRE" (May 2, Al Jazeera/The National/RTE/multiple) — Israeli strikes killed 41 people in southern Lebanon in a single 24-hour period on May 2, the deadliest day since the ceasefire began on April 17. Israel claims to have destroyed approximately 50 Hezbollah-linked sites in the same period. Total killed since March 2: 2,659 with 8,183 injured (up from C56's 2,500+ estimate). C56 reported "12 killed May 2" from early morning reports — the full 24-hour toll is 41, a 3.4x escalation. Al Jazeera's correspondent from Beirut: the ceasefire "exists in name only... the war continues, and in fact it is expanding." Forced displacement orders continue. This is not ceasefire erosion — this is active warfare under a ceasefire label. The rate of killing DURING the ceasefire (41 in 24 hours) approaches pre-ceasefire rates. The mid-May formal expiry is now irrelevant — the ceasefire died days ago.

1. IRAN WARNS "RENEWED CONFLICT WITH US POSSIBLE" (May 2, CNN/Al Jazeera/multiple) — A senior Iranian military official stated that renewed conflict with the United States is possible after Trump rejected Iran's latest peace proposal. Al Jazeera's headline: "Diplomacy in danger as threat of resumed war elevates." This is the first explicit Iranian statement acknowledging the possibility of resumed hostilities since the ceasefire began on April 8. Previously, Iran's messaging was uniformly diplomatic ("open to dialogue," "conditional openness"). The shift to "renewed conflict possible" signals that Tehran's internal debate is moving toward a harder line. Combined with the Iranian army's earlier statement that it remains "in a war situation" (April 28), the military establishment appears to be preparing its domestic audience for potential resumption. The diplomatic pathway via Pakistan mediation is not dead but is now explicitly acknowledged as potentially insufficient.

1. BRENT FADING TO ~$108.17 — SNAP-BACK DYING; HOPE TRADE WINNING AGAIN (May 2, OilPriceAPI/TradingEconomics/CNBC) — C56's snap-back ($107→$109-112) is FADING. Brent has pulled back to ~$108.17, below the $109-112 range C56 tracked. WTI correspondingly soft at ~$101. The partial snap-back C55 predicted and C56 confirmed is now REVERSING. The hope trade — the market's pricing of some probability of a deal — is reasserting despite Trump saying "can't agree," despite Iran warning of renewed conflict, and despite the OFAC toll sanctions alert. The market is either (a) pricing the ceasefire's continued nominal existence as more important than the rhetoric, (b) responding to the Ford carrier exit as a de-escalation signal, or (c) simply following the OPEC+ output increase path and demand destruction math. At $108, Brent is approaching the C55 crash low of $107. If $107 breaks, the next support is $100 WTI (which held on May 1). The $115 former floor is now confirmed as ceiling/resistance. New effective range: $105-112 (tighter and LOWER than C56's $105-115).

1. CENTCOM GROUND FORCE PLANS DETAILED: 2,500 MARINES + KHARG ISLAND SEIZURE OPTION (April 30-May 2, Axios/JPost/Euronews/WLT/multiple) — Details of the CENTCOM briefing to Trump (April 30) are now more fully reported. Two primary options: (a) "Short and powerful" wave of infrastructure strikes to break the negotiating deadlock — hit hard enough to force Tehran back to the table with flexibility on nuclear; (b) TAKING OVER PART OF THE STRAIT to reopen it to commercial shipping, potentially including ground forces. The US has dispatched 2,500 additional marines trained for amphibious landings. Speculation centers on Kharg Island — bombed earlier in the war (air infrastructure destroyed, oil infrastructure left intact). A Kharg seizure would give the US control of Iran's largest oil export terminal AND a physical position inside the strait. This is NOT a confirmed operation — it is a briefed option. But the 2,500 marines are a real deployment, and their amphibious training matches the Kharg scenario. The ground force option represents a QUALITATIVE ESCALATION beyond anything discussed since the war began: from air war + naval blockade to potential ground invasion of Iranian territory.

1. Conflict status — DAY 64 / CEASEFIRE DAY 25 (IRAN: "RENEWED CONFLICT POSSIBLE"; OFAC TOLL SANCTIONS; LEBANON 41 KILLED)

2. Strait operational status — DOUBLY LOCKED: KINETIC (IRAN) + LEGAL (US SANCTIONS)

3. Tanker attacks log — NO NEW INCIDENTS

Running total: 69 maritime events since war start. 3v3 vessel seizure tally (unchanged). No new kinetic maritime incidents in the C56→C57 window.

4. Oil prices — SNAP-BACK FADING; BRENT ~$108; HOPE TRADE REASSERTING

5. SPR — EXCHANGE RFP BIDS DUE MAY 4

6. Bypass infrastructure — NO MATERIAL CHANGE VS C56

7. Insurance — NO MATERIAL CHANGE

8. Sanctions / Shadow fleet — OFAC TOLL ALERT DOMINATES

9. Country matrix — IRAN HARDENS; US PUBLIC TURNS

10. Policy log (C57 additions)

• May 1-2 — OFAC ALERT: HORMUZ TOLL SANCTIONS — Paying Iran safe passage fees = sanctionable; covers fiat, digital assets, swaps, charitable donations to IRCS/Bonyad Mostazafan/embassy accounts; non-US persons face secondary sanctions (OFAC/Bloomberg/WaPo/CBC/USNews)
• May 2 — IRAN: "RENEWED CONFLICT POSSIBLE" — Senior military official; first explicit acknowledgment of resumed hostilities possibility since ceasefire (CNN/Al Jazeera)
• May 2 — LEBANON: 41 KILLED IN 24 HOURS — Deadliest day during ceasefire; 50 Hezbollah sites destroyed; total 2,659 killed/8,183 wounded since March 2; ceasefire "in name only" (Al Jazeera/The National/RTE)
• May 2 — BRENT FADES TO ~$108 — Snap-back dying; approaching C55 crash low of $107; hope trade reasserting (OilPriceAPI/TradingEconomics)
• May 2 — 61% AMERICANS SAY FORCE WAS MISTAKE — WaPo-ABC-Ipsos poll; first tracked domestic opposition metric (WaPo)
• Apr 30-May 2 — CENTCOM GROUND FORCE OPTION DETAILED — 2,500 marines dispatched (amphibious-trained); Kharg Island seizure speculated; "short and powerful" strike option also briefed (Axios/JPost/Euronews)
• May 2 — SPR EXCHANGE RFP BIDS DUE MAY 4 — Next delivery tranche (Rigzone/DOE)
• May 2 — IRAN NUCLEAR: REFUSES ENRICHMENT LIMITS — Head of Atomic Energy Organization: will not accept limits; contradicts Trump claim Iran "agreed to no enrichment" (multiple)

11. Metrics dashboard

12. Structural locks — 113 total (+4 vs C56)

C56 lock status updates

• #100 Oil price crash / physical disconnect: WORSENING. Snap-back is dying. Brent $108.17 approaching C55 crash low of $107. The hope trade is winning despite: OFAC toll sanctions, Iran "renewed conflict" warning, 41 killed in Lebanon, CENTCOM ground force plans. The disconnect between physical reality (strait at 5%, four closure mechanisms, 10M bpd gap) and price ($108, falling) is WIDENING again.
• #105 Carrier reduction lock: CONFIRMED — no Ford replacement announced. 2→2 carriers. But 2,500 marines add ground capability the carriers lacked.
• #109 Lebanon ceasefire death-by-attrition lock: ESCALATED. 41 killed in 24 hours — deadliest day during ceasefire. 50 sites destroyed. Total 2,659/8,183. Al Jazeera: "in name only." This is no longer attrition. This is active warfare with a ceasefire label.

NEW C57 locks (+4)

• #110 OFAC Hormuz toll sanctions lock — The OFAC alert creates a FOURTH closure mechanism for the strait. Previous three: (1) Iranian kinetic threats, (2) insurance withdrawal, (3) US naval blockade. Now: (4) US legal sanctions on transit fees. Any ship that cooperates with Iran to transit = sanctionable. Any ship that doesn't cooperate with Iran = attackable. The result: NO compliant commercial path through the strait. This lock is particularly durable because it is LEGAL, not kinetic — it doesn't require military assets to maintain. The sanctions framework can persist indefinitely with zero operational cost to the US. Even if the ceasefire holds, even if attacks stop, even if P&I re-enters, the OFAC framework can keep the strait commercially closed simply by making Iranian cooperation legally toxic. LOCKED — quadruple closure mechanism; legal lock requires no military maintenance; most durable closure mechanism to date; strait commercially dead until OFAC revokes.

• #111 Iran "renewed conflict" rhetoric lock — Iran's shift from "conditional openness" to "renewed conflict possible" represents a regime-level communication change. This is not a Twitter post — it's a senior military official quoted by CNN. The Iranian military establishment is preparing domestic and international audiences for potential resumption. When combined with the army's "still in war situation" statement (April 28), the pattern is: the ceasefire is being treated as a PAUSE, not a terminus. The military has not stood down, the rhetoric has not de-escalated, and the institutional posture is readiness-for-resumption. LOCKED — first explicit Iranian acknowledgment of possible resumed hostilities; military "war situation" maintained; ceasefire = pause, not peace; diplomatic pathway acknowledged as potentially insufficient.

• #112 CENTCOM ground force escalation lock — The briefing of a ground force option (take over part of the strait, potentially Kharg Island, with 2,500 marines) represents a QUALITATIVE ESCALATION in the war's possibility space. The war to date has been air + naval. A ground operation on Iranian territory would be categorically different: it creates occupation dynamics, casualty risk, and domestic political exposure that air operations don't. The 61% disapproval makes this option politically dangerous but the marines are physically in theater. The lock is the EXISTENCE of the option, not its execution: once ground force plans are briefed and assets deployed, the option exerts gravitational pull on decision-making. Trump now has a ground option he didn't have before. The option itself changes the calculus even if never used. LOCKED — ground force option briefed; 2,500 marines deployed; Kharg Island speculated; qualitative escalation from air/naval to potential ground; 61% disapproval constrains but doesn't eliminate; option's existence changes calculus.

• #113 US public opinion constraint lock — 61% of Americans say Trump's use of military force against Iran was a mistake (WaPo-ABC-Ipsos). This is the first tracked domestic political constraint on the war. It creates asymmetric pressure: escalation (Path B/D) faces majority opposition, while the managed siege (Path C) avoids the "mistake" frame by being framed as "the war is terminated." The political incentive structure favors: (a) maintaining the blockade/siege (no new visible military action), (b) avoiding ground operations (highest visibility, highest political cost), (c) claiming credit for the ceasefire (the war is "over"), (d) blaming Iran if it resumes ("they broke it"). The 61% constrains escalation more than it constrains the siege. LOCKED — 61% oppose force; constrains Path B/D escalation; favors Path C managed siege; "terminated" narrative politically optimal; ground option politically toxic despite military readiness.

13. Active clocks

14. Convergence assessment

C56 hypothesis: THE MANAGED SIEGE — administration maximizing pressure while reducing footprint, rejecting proposals without terminating talks, declaring war over while arming allies.

C56→C57 correction: C56's managed siege thesis remains CORRECT as the dominant trajectory but C57 adds THREE complicating factors that stress the framework:

(a) The OFAC toll alert STRENGTHENS the siege — it adds a fourth closure mechanism that requires zero military assets to maintain. The managed siege is now MORE DURABLE, not less. The legal sanctions framework can outlast any military deployment.

(b) Iran's "renewed conflict" warning CHALLENGES the siege — the siege works only if Iran acquiesces to it. If Iran escalates kinetically to break the siege, the managed posture collapses into Path B/D. Iran is signaling it may not accept indefinite strangulation.

(c) 61% public opposition CONSTRAINS the response — if Iran does escalate, the US faces a political constraint on escalatory response. The 61% favors de-escalation, not escalation. This creates a gap between military capability (2,500 marines, CENTCOM plans) and political permission (majority opposition to force).

C57's specific C56 corrections:

(a) C56 price prediction — C56 implied $105-115 range would hold. INCORRECT. Snap-back faded to $108, narrowing the range to $105-112. C56 overestimated the snap-back's durability.

(b) C56's "four contradictory postures" — C57 adds a FIFTH: OFAC toll sanctions (legal warfare). The administration is now running five simultaneous postures: war terminated, blast them away, force shrinking (Ford), force growing ($8.6B arms + 2,500 marines), legal strangulation (OFAC).

(c) C56 did NOT predict: the OFAC toll alert, Lebanon's 41-killed escalation (C56 reported 12), Iran's "renewed conflict" warning, or the Brent fade below $109.

What C57 adds:

The defining signal of C57 is the QUADRUPLE LOCK:

The strait is now closed by four interlocking mechanisms:

1. KINETIC — Iran attacks non-cooperating vessels
2. INSURANCE — Zero P&I; commercial transit uninsurable
3. NAVAL — US blockade; 40+ vessels redirected
4. LEGAL — OFAC toll sanctions; cooperating with Iran = sanctionable

The OFAC toll alert is particularly significant because it transforms the strait closure from a MILITARY problem into a LEGAL one. Military closures can be reopened by force or by ceasefire. Legal closures require bureaucratic action (OFAC revocation) that operates on a different timeline and with different institutional inertia. The sanctions framework can persist long after military operations end, as demonstrated by decades of Iran sanctions that survived multiple diplomatic cycles.

The Lebanon situation has moved from "erosion" (C55-C56) to "active warfare with a label" (C57). 41 killed in 24 hours approaches pre-ceasefire rates. 50 Hezbollah sites destroyed in a single day is a military operation, not a ceasefire violation. The distinction is now semantic. This makes Iran's Phase 1 (ceasefire on all fronts) not just difficult but FARCICAL — you cannot demand a ceasefire when one front is conducting daily military operations that kill 41 people.

Iran's "renewed conflict possible" statement is the first crack in the ceasefire's diplomatic architecture. If Iran acts on this — and the military's "war situation" posture suggests readiness — the managed siege collapses. The question is: when does economic strangulation ($4.8B cost, $170M/day continuing) exceed Iran's pain threshold? The answer depends on China (Iran's remaining customer) and the shadow fleet's ability to circumvent the blockade. The OFAC toll alert targets exactly this: it makes the Chinese bypass harder by sanctioning anyone who cooperates with Iranian transit fees.

Revised probability distribution:

• Path A (Comprehensive framework): 0.5% (unchanged). Nuclear deadlock absolute — Iran refuses enrichment limits, Trump claims Iran agreed to zero enrichment. Both claims are irreconcilable.

• Path A' (Narrow deal: Hormuz reopening): 7% (–2 from C56). DOWNGRADE. OFAC toll alert makes Hormuz reopening harder even IF a deal is struck — the legal framework must be formally revoked. Iran's "renewed conflict" warning reduces diplomatic momentum. Nuclear enrichment contradiction hardens. Lebanon makes Phase 1 impossible.

• Path B (Full kinetic resumption): 20% (–2 from C56). DOWNGRADE on EXECUTION probability, UPGRADE on CAPABILITY. CENTCOM has briefed ground force options. 2,500 marines in theater. Capability is HIGHER than C56. But 61% public opposition creates political constraint. The option exists but the political permission to use it has SHRUNK. Net: slightly lower probability of execution despite higher capability.

• Path C (Indefinite siege / managed strangulation): 48% (+4 from C56). UPGRADE. OFAC toll alert is the strongest Path C signal yet — it adds a legal closure mechanism that costs nothing to maintain and can persist indefinitely. The managed siege gains a new dimension: legal strangulation alongside military, economic, and insurance strangulation. Public opinion (61% oppose force) pushes the administration toward siege over escalation. Oil price decline (Brent $108, approaching crash low) reduces domestic political pressure from gas prices.

• Path D (Major kinetic escalation during ceasefire): 24.5% (unchanged). Lebanon's 41-killed day and Iran's "renewed conflict" statement maintain this probability. The catalytic risk is unchanged: Iran retaliates against the siege, Lebanon ceasefire formally collapses, or CENTCOM ground option is activated.

The irony of C57: the more completely the strait is locked, the MORE the oil market prices in resolution. Brent at $108 (approaching the $107 crash low) with four closure mechanisms active is the most extreme price-physical disconnect of the war. The market is either pricing in a resolution the fundamentals don't support, or it is pricing in sufficient demand destruction and alternative supply to absorb a permanent Hormuz loss. Neither interpretation is fully convincing. The disconnect is the tracker's central tension, and it is WIDENING.

Risk level: EXTREME — CRITICAL — THE QUADRUPLE LOCK (OFAC TOLL SANCTIONS CLOSE LAST COMMERCIAL PATH; LEBANON 41 KILLED IN 24H — DEADLIEST CEASEFIRE DAY; IRAN: "RENEWED CONFLICT POSSIBLE"; BRENT FADING TO $108 — SNAP-BACK DYING; CENTCOM GROUND FORCE + STRIKE OPTIONS BRIEFED; 2,500 MARINES DISPATCHED; 61% OPPOSE FORCE; STRAIT CLOSED BY FOUR MECHANISMS: KINETIC + INSURANCE + NAVAL + LEGAL; NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT DEADLOCK ABSOLUTE; PRICE-PHYSICAL DISCONNECT WIDENING; DAY 64)

15. Watchlist — C58 triggers

1. $107 Brent retest — Only $1.17 above C55 crash low. If it breaks, $100 WTI is next. If $100 breaks, the war premium floor is gone.
2. OFAC toll enforcement — First enforcement action against a toll-paying vessel will test compliance and set precedent. Watch for seizures or sanctions designations.
3. Iran "renewed conflict" follow-through — Does the rhetoric produce action? Watch for IRGC positioning, mine activity, or proxy activation.
4. Lebanon weekend violence — 41 killed on Saturday. Sunday historically similar or worse. If the weekend toll exceeds 60+, the ceasefire label becomes untenable.
5. SPR RFP bids May 4 — Sunday deadline. Acceptance speed signals urgency.
6. CENTCOM ground decision — No decision announced. Watch for marine positioning, naval movements near Kharg, or amphibious exercises.
7. Congressional weekend statements — Return May 11. 61% opposition + "terminated" letter + $8.6B arms bypass = confrontation ingredients.
8. China response to OFAC toll alert — The alert targets non-US persons (secondary sanctions). China's reaction — compliance, defiance, or silence — determines the toll alert's effectiveness.
9. Iran nuclear statement — Head of Atomic Energy Organization refused enrichment limits. Trump claims agreement. Does Iran escalate the contradiction?
10. Oil Monday open — Weekend accumulates risk (Lebanon violence, Iran rhetoric, CENTCOM decisions). Monday open will price the weekend.

16. Sources

OFAC Toll Sanctions Alert

• OFAC Alert: Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage
• US News: US Warns Shipping Firms They Could Face Sanctions Over Paying Iranian Tolls
• CBC News: US warns shipping firms could face sanctions over paying Iran's Strait of Hormuz tolls
• Bloomberg: US Warns Shippers on Sanctions Risk for Paying Iran Strait of Hormuz Tolls
• Washington Post: US warns shipping firms over paying Iran to transit the Strait of Hormuz
• Washington Times: US warns shipping firms over paying Iran to transit the Strait of Hormuz
• Boston Globe: Shipping firms could face sanctions over paying Iranian tolls
• ABC News: US warns shipping firms over paying Iranian tolls

Lebanon Escalation

• Al Jazeera: Israeli air strikes on Lebanon kill 41 people in 24 hours
• The National: Several killed as Israel launches dozens of intense strikes across south Lebanon
• RTE: Lebanon says 13 killed in Israeli strikes on south
• Security Council Report: Lebanon May 2026 Monthly Forecast

Iran Rhetoric / Negotiations

• CNN: Iran says renewed conflict with US possible after Trump rejects latest peace proposal
• Al Jazeera: Diplomacy in danger as threat of resumed war elevates
• Al Jazeera: What's happening on day 64 as Trump rejects Tehran's proposal
• PBS: Trump rejects Iran's latest proposal as he reviews new military options

Oil Prices

• OilPriceAPI: Brent Crude Oil Price Today — $108.17/bbl
• TradingEconomics: Brent Crude Oil
• TradingEconomics: Crude Oil (WTI)
• CNBC: Brent oil pulls back after climbing

CENTCOM / Military Plans

• Axios: Commanders to brief Trump on new Iran military options Thursday
• JPost: CENTCOM prepares 'short and powerful' wave of strikes on Iran
• Euronews: US seeks 'maritime freedom' coalition to restart Strait of Hormuz shipping
• WLT Report: Trump Set to Receive CENTCOM Briefing on Military Options

SPR / Energy

• Rigzone: DOE Continues 'Swift Execution' of 172M Barrel SPR Exchange
• DOE: United States to Release 172 Million Barrels from the SPR

Public Opinion

• Washington Post-ABC-Ipsos: 61% say Trump's use of force against Iran was a mistake

Nuclear / Enrichment

• House of Commons Library: US-Iran ceasefire and nuclear talks in 2026

Shipping / Insurance

• Strauss Center: Strait of Hormuz Insurance Market
• CNN: Visualizing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz since war began
• Seavantage: Strait of Hormuz Crisis 2026 — Full Timeline

Casualties

• Wikipedia: Casualties of the 2026 Iran war
• Al Jazeera: US-Israel attacks on Iran — Death toll and injuries live tracker

Run completed 2026-05-02 ~20:00 UTC. Grok bridge: NO (Apple Notes MCP timed out). Full 13-topic web sweep. Baseline C56 → C57 gap ~6h (May 2 AM → May 2 PM). Key deltas: (1) OFAC TOLL SANCTIONS ALERT — paying Iran for Hormuz passage now sanctionable; fiat/crypto/swaps/charitable donations all covered; creates FOURTH closure mechanism (kinetic + insurance + naval + legal = QUADRUPLE LOCK); most durable closure mechanism to date; requires zero military maintenance. (2) LEBANON: 41 KILLED IN 24 HOURS — deadliest day during "ceasefire"; 50 Hezbollah sites destroyed; total 2,659 killed/8,183 wounded since Mar 2; Al Jazeera: "in name only." (3) IRAN: "RENEWED CONFLICT POSSIBLE" — first explicit acknowledgment since ceasefire; military "still in war situation"; hardened from "conditional openness." (4) BRENT FADING TO $108.17 — snap-back dying; approaching C55 crash low of $107; hope trade reasserting; price-physical disconnect WIDENING. (5) CENTCOM GROUND FORCE PLANS — 2,500 marines dispatched (amphibious-trained); Kharg Island seizure speculated; "short and powerful" strike option also briefed; qualitative escalation from air/naval to potential ground. (6) 61% AMERICANS SAY FORCE WAS MISTAKE — constrains Path B/D; favors Path C managed siege. (7) NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT DEADLOCK ABSOLUTE — Iran refuses limits; Trump claims agreement; irreconcilable. (8) SPR RFP BIDS DUE MAY 4. Four new locks: #110 OFAC Hormuz toll sanctions (fourth closure mechanism; legal, self-sustaining, indefinite); #111 Iran "renewed conflict" rhetoric (ceasefire = pause not peace; military readiness maintained); #112 CENTCOM ground force escalation (2,500 marines; Kharg option; qualitative shift); #113 US public opinion constraint (61% oppose; constrains escalation; favors siege). Path distribution revised: A 0.5% (unch), A' 7% (–2 — OFAC lock + Iran hardening + nuclear deadlock), B 20% (–2 — 61% opposition constrains despite capability increase), C 48% (+4 — OFAC toll alert strengthens legal siege; public opinion favors), D 24.5% (unch — Lebanon + Iran rhetoric maintain). Transition from THE MANAGED SIEGE (C56) to THE QUADRUPLE LOCK — four interlocking closure mechanisms; most structurally complete chokepoint interdiction in modern history; price-physical disconnect widening as market prices in resolution the fundamentals don't support. Risk: EXTREME — CRITICAL — THE QUADRUPLE LOCK.

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